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This thesis analyzes the effect of Russian culture and
Soviet ideology on Soviet science. Russian culture is shown
to inhibit the ability of Soviet scientists to achieve major
breakthroughs or develop radically new theories. Culture
does, however, enhance the Soviet ability to thoroughly
exploit and innovatively apply proven scientific theories
and technologies. The Soviet inability to achieve break-
throughs compels their reliance on Western technology.
Their proficiency in exploiting proven technologies enables
the Soviets to compete effectively with Western military
systems. Thomas Kuhn's description of the scientific
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The ability of a nation to pursue scientific research is
one of the many factors determining its national security.
Although distinct from technology, since the 1870s scien-
tific research has become increasingly related to techno-
logical advances and increasingly relevant to socioeconomic
developments. Before then, technological improvements had
been generated primarily by craftsmen and innovators
independently of the achievements of the scientific
community [Ref. 1: pp. 142-146]. Since the 1870s, however,
the pattern of technological development has been typified
by increased interaction between the basic research, applied
research, and engineering communities. Basic scientific
research has thus assumed an integral role in determining
national economic and military capabilities through
technological advances.
The importance of science to a nation's security was
highlighted in the report submitted by the United States
National Commission on Excellence in Education to President
Reagan in April, 1983. This report, "A Nation at Risk: The
Imperative for Educational Reform", while addressing the
overall deterioration in American precollege education,
identifies science and mathematics as critical areas to be
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emphasized in educational reform. Glenn T. Seaborg , a
member of the Commission, writes that
The deficiency in the quality and quantity of teaching
of science and mathematics— subjects that are emphasized
in a number of countries that are our competi tors--is
undoubtedly a factor in our country's economic decline.
Lack of scientific literacy threatens the efficient, or
even adequate, functioning of our democracy in this
scientific age. [Ref. 2: p. 219]
Of particular importance to the United States and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the role of science
in the military sphere. As intense military competitors,
the two nations are concerned not only with acquiring and
maintaining an optimal technological edge vis a vis each
other but also are the world leaders and providers of
military technology. For the United States, maintaining a
technological superiority has been an essential element in
its strategy to counter the Soviet ability to maintain
massive troop levels and sustain the production of
commensurate quantities of military equipment.
By directly identifying the threat and recognizing the
"natural vulnerabilities" [Ref. 3: p. 70] and limitations of
a democratic state when confronted over an extended period
by a totalitarian state, NSC 68 began the evolution of a
policy which relies on a system of alliances and on
technological superiority to offset resource constraints.
Historically, this technological reliance was initially
based on the United States' sole possession of an atomic
11

capability during the late 1940s. In the 1950s, as the
Soviets progressed in their ability to produce and deliver
nuclear weapons, the United States relied upon its superior
strategic airpower and tactical nuclear capability. Even as
Soviet military technology continued to close the gap in
strategic weapons over the next two decades, the United
States and its allies pursued a "doctrine of quality"
[Ref. 4: p. 550], emphasizing qualitative rather than
numerical superiority in conventional forces. Most
recently, the American penchant for relying on technological
developments was demonstrated in President Reagan's dramatic
"Star Wars" speech of March 23, 1983 in which he announced
the intention to increase research and development efforts
in spaceborne antiball istic missile systems. Thus, since
the initial stages of the United States-Soviet confronta-
tion, the United States depended on technological
superiority to counter Soviet quantitative superiority.
This technological superiority is, in turn, partially
dependent on American resourcefulness in scientific
research
.
For the Soviet Union, scientific and technical advances
were essential to overcoming the American threat of nuclear
blackmail. Having achieved a rough degree of strategic
parity, however, the Soviet Union continued to invest
heavily in research and development. This investment in
12

dollar amounts for the period 1964 to 1968 was approximately
half that of the United States. By 1970/ however, the
Soviet investment in research and development was equal to
that of the United States. Since 1970 the dollar cost of
Soviet research, development, test and evaluation has been
growing at approximately seven percent a year, bringing the
1976 cost to 50 percent over the comparable United States
investment [Ref. 4: p. 558; and Ref. 5: p. 29]. Signifi-
cantly, since 1976 the Soviets have been increasing the
percentage of research, development, test and evaluation
expenditures relative to their total military budget. The
emphasis placed by the Soviet Union on research and
development, in comparison with the United States and other
countries, can be seen in Figure 1 which illustrates the
percent of gross national product each country devoted to
research and development for the period 1961 to 1978.
[Ref. 6: p. 6]
A further indication of the level of Soviet interest in
pursuing research and development is the size of their
research and development force of scientists and engineers.
The Soviet Union surpasses the United States both in
absolute numbers of scientists and engineers engaged in
research and development and in the number of scientists and
engineers conducting research and development activities per
10,000 of the labor force population. The latter trend for
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The results of the Soviets' intense efforts in research
and development over the past thirty years have been
marginal in civilian related technologies, impressive in the
military sphere, and occasionally startling. The United
States was surprised by the rapidity with which the Soviet
Union developed and deployed strategic weapons and shocked
by the launching of the first Sputnik on October 4, 1957.
Less dramatic, but perhaps more indicative of the status of
the general technological base, are the advances in the
Soviets' conventional and tactical military forces. A
comparison of technology levels in deployed military systems
shown in Table I [Ref. 5: p. 52] suggests that the Soviets'
efforts in research and development have been highly
successful in the military sector. This success, in fact,
led Richard D. DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering, to present the following testimony
before the House Armed Services Committee in March 1982.
Mr. Chairman, I'm frankly impressed with what (the
Soviets have) done. Our past technology lead can no
longer offset the quantity deficiency by itself— the
numerical disadvantage in most categories of weapons is
too great, and our advantage in most deployed
technologies is too small. This is the reason for our
emphasis in the FY 1983 RD&A budget and programs in
deploying increased quantities of operationally
effective systems as rapidly as possible, and on
increasing our ability to infuse our emerging technology
into deployed systems more rapidly. [Ref. 5: p. 14]
The Soviet Union's progress in military technology has
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not mirrored in either the civilian sector or in basic
technology. Hedrick Smith and Robert Kaiser address the
dearth of technological conveniences available to civilians
in their accounts of experiences in the Soviet Union [Ref. 7
and Ref. 8] . The standard of living of most Soviet citizens
would be considered rather backward by /American standards.
The Soviet Union's priority for military requirements is one
factor which accounts for this lag in the civilian sector.
But the Soviets also lag in military-related basic technol-
ogies. Table II [Ref. 5: p. 51] compares the Soviet and
American standing in basic technologies which have the
greatest potential for significantly changing military
capabilities in the next ten to twenty years. The United
States has maintained a general lead in these basic
technologies although, as indicated, this advantage is
decreasing. A comparison of the status of basic
technologies depicted in Table II with the status of
deployed technologies depicted in Table I serves to
emphasize the disparity between the Soviet achievements in
these two levels of technological development.
The disparity is suggestive of the Soviet Union's heavy
reliance on a steady infusion of Western technology. They
have been extremely active in acquiring Western technology
through both overt and covert methods, and have proven adept
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despite the Soviet Union's ability to absorb Western
technology into deployed military systems and in spite of
the extensive resources dedicated to developing research
capabilities, the Soviet Union lags substantially in basic
technology and basic research. The infusion of Western
technology has not invigorated Soviet basic research to
self-sufficiency.
Why does Soviet basic research continue to lag
dramatically, forcing a continued reliance on foreign
technology to remain competitive in the military sphere?
This is the central question to be addressed by this paper.
Many factors are involved in determining the viability of
Soviet research. Significant among these is the weakness of
the technological base, which hampers the development of
laboratory equipment and the availability of computer and
administrative support equipment. Another significant
element is the distinct separation between military and
civilian research efforts, which restricts interaction among
the scientific communities. Additionally, Russian culture
and Soviet ideology must be considered as major determinants
in Soviet research capability.
This paper will focus on the impact of culture and
ideology on Soviet science, using Thomas Kuhn's analysis of
the scientific process as a schema. Science is an activity
involving both the scientific community and the external
20

influences of society. This implies that, rather than a
purely objective pursuit, science is a process permeable to
cultural and ideological influences. The ability of a
nation to conduct scientific research will therefore be
dependent in some way on its cultural and ideological
attributes. My thesis is that Russian culture and Soviet
ideology are among the factors impelling the Soviet Union's
dependence on Western technology.
21

II. THE SCIENTIFIC PROCESS
A. OBSERVATION AND OBJECTIVITY
Science is commonly held to be an objective and rigorous
investigation of natural processes. Even under the scrutiny
of science, however, objectivity in the sense of an external
reality or "truth" is illusive. Scientific theories attempt
to explain natural events by observing phenomena under
carefully controlled conditions and interpreting these
observations within a logical conceptual framework. Because
of the demands within the scientific community for precise
documentation of these controlled experiments, the
requirement for replication of results, and the expectation
of agreement between hypothetical and observed data, science
has gained a reputation for objectivity. But neither the
act of observation nor the conceptualization of a
theoretical framework is an objective process.
Observation is a process in which an external stimulus
evokes a physical reaction which, after neural processing,
registers as a sensory input or datum. Medical and
psychological experiments indicate that the effect of the
neural processing in modifying the stimuli is significant.
In transforming external stimuli to data, the neural process
is both selective and interpretive. The selectivity of the
22

process was demonstrated in an experiment in which subjects
were shown Figure 3 for a short time. As Figure 3
indicates, each of the triangles contained a well-known
phrase but repeated one of the articles, "the" or "and".
Most subjects, however, were unaware of the repetition
unless shown the phrases repeatedly or for prolonged periods
[Ref. 9: p. 34]. The neural process acted as a filter
selecting the stimuli to be acknowledged.
Another experiment, conducted by J.S. Bruner and Leo
Postman in 1949, demonstrated the modification of external
stimuli by the neural process. Subjects were exposed to a
series of playing cards which included both normal playing
cards and cards which mixed suits and colors (e.g. red
spades) . After an initial exposure almost all subjects
identified both the normal 3nd the mixed cards as normal
cards (e.g. a red spade would be perceived as a black
spade) . Again, it required increased exposure before the
subjects were able to identify the inclusion and the nature
'of the discrepancies. Some subjects never adjusted to the
inclusion of these cards [Ref. 10: pp. 62-3]. In this case,
the neural process modified the stimuli of the discrepant
cards causing the acknowledged data to conform to
expectations
.
Both of these experiments utilized sets of stimuli about
which the subjects had strong preconceptions— the first
23
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experiment involved cliche phrases and the second experiment
employed common playing cards. Thus, the subjects, based on
prior experiences, had already constructed mental images of
the phrases and cards before participating in the experi-
ments. As a result of the subjects' repeated prior
experiences with these phrases and cards, their mental
images had become well established and had acquired an
inertial resistance to change. When exposed to a very
similar set of stimuli, the subjects' neural processes
selected and modified the stimuli such that the resultant
data conformed to the established image or pattern. To
overcome the inertia of the image, repeated or prolonged
exposures to the discrepant stimuli was necessary. Once the
discrepant stimuli acquired, either incrementally or from a
single major impact, enough energy to overcome the inertia,
then the image itself was modified to subsume the new data
and the discrepancies were perceived. [Ref. 11: pp. 5-10]
The advantage of this process of modification and
filtration is that the mind is able to assimilate large
volumes of stimuli fairly quickly (100 bits per second)
.
Incoming stimuli are transformed into data sets which can be
compared to the established image or pattern. Based on
these similarity patterns, the mind can react to the stimuli
more rapidly. The "disadvantage" to this process is that
the stimuli must be transformed by the neural process before
25

being relevant to the mind as data. The implication is that
the observation process cannot be objective. The "reality"
of the external stimuli is not perceived directly, but
rather through the veil of neural process. Stimuli may be
filtered out as superfluous, or may be modified to conform
to recognizable patterns— and this process occurs before the
mind consciously registers the observation. As previously
noted, however, sufficiently energetic discrepant stimuli
can eventually modify the image involved in this process.
Thomas Kuhn points out that
Nor are responses like these entirely innate. One can
learn to discriminate colors or patterns which were
indistinguishable prior to the training. To an extent
still unknown, the production of data from stimuli is a
learned procedure. After the learning process, the same
stimulus evokes a different datum. [Ref. 1: pp. 308-9]
In other words, education can adjust the image and the
subsets of similarity patterns.
The construction of shared images and similarity
patterns through education and group experiences is one of
the attributes which distinguishes a professional community.
Kuhn denotes these similarity patterns for the scientific
community as paradigms [Ref. 1: pp. 293-319]. The science
student is exposed to explicitly stated theories and
historically relevant experiments and then assigned problem
sets which demonstrate the principles involved. These
problem sets demonstrate to the student specific applica-
tions of the general, formal symbolic expressions. As an
26

example, Kuhn points out that the specific application of
the general expression, f=ma, involves symbolic substitu-
tion. Thus, force, f, becomes mass times gravity, mg , in
the more specific application of free fall problems [Ref. 1:
p. 299] . Problem sets exercise for the student the
relationships enveloped by the symbolic expressions. In
addition to demonstrating these specific applications, the
problem sets serve as exemplars to which the science student
can refer when confronted with new problems. The new
problem can then be solved by analogous application. As
exemplars, such problem sets are major determinants in
constructing the shared images of the scientific
communities
.
Acquiring an arsenal of exemplars, just as much as
learning symbolic generalizations, is integral to the
process by which a student gains access to the
cognitive achievements of his disciplinary group.
[Ref. 1: p. 307]
.
The construction and transmission of shared images is
vital to shaping scientific communities and the strength of
.these shared images contributes to the effectiveness of the
scientific process. Traditionally, training in the natural
sciences has been characterized by the rigorous study of
approved science textbooks. These textbooks typically
present currently accepted theories, the supporting
experimental evidence, and problem sets as described above.
Science textbooks do not consider the periods of controversy
27

leading to the community's acceptance of a theory, nor do
they present research products in an unrefined state
representative of professional journals and writings.
Rather, textbooks are designed to efficiently inculcate the
student in the dicta of his field of study [Ref. 1: pp.
228-9]. This rigorous process of indoctrination, with its
minimal exposure to alternative theories, generates a set of
images which enjoy a high degree of conformity among the
members of the scientific community. The cohesiveness of
the shared images increases further within the various
subgroups of scientific specialties. [Ref. 1: p. 307]
B. NORMAL AND EXTRAORDINARY SCIENCES
The ability of the scientific community to generate and
transmit a body of images among its members is one of the
necessary characteristics for conducting the phase of
research which Kuhn has termed "normal science". Normal
science is premised on the accepted theories and paradigms
incorporated in the shared images of the community. The
existing theories provide the scientist a basis for
formulating hypotheses and designing experiments to test
them. Kuhn describes three major types of challenges
addressed by normal science. The first challenge is to
bring theory and observation into closer agreement either by
making minor adjustments to the existing theory or by
developing new techniques of observation. The second
28

challenge is to extend existing theory to untried areas of
application. The third challenge is to collect the volumes
of specific data which support the application and extension
of existing theory [Ref . 1: p. 233] . These challenges
confront the scientist as puzzles to be solved within the
framework of accepted theory.
The "puzzle solving tradition" of normal science [Ref.
10: pp. 35-42] is a powerful vehicle for scientific
advancement. The consensus among the members of a mature
scientific specialty enables the scientist to concentrate on
narrowly defined problems derived from existing theory. The
existing theories not only clearly define for the scientist
the nature of the puzzles, but also provide him with a
framework for their solutions by generating a web of
expectations. The power of this consensus differentiates
the natural, mature sciences from the arts and social
sciences
.
... History strongly suggests that, though one can
practice science— as one does philosophy or art or
political science--wi thout a firm consensus, this more
flexible practice will not produce the pattern of rapid
consequential scientific advance to which recent
centuries have accustomed us.... Except under quite
special conditions, the practitioner of a mature
science does not pause to examine divergent modes of
explanation or experimentation. [Ref. 1: p. 232]
The consensus characteristic of normal science provides
the foundation for another phase of research which Kuhn
terms "extraordinary science". As previously noted,
29

existing theories provide the scientist with both the
puzzles and some expectation of the nature of their
solutions. The web of expectations serves as a frame of
reference against which the scientist can determine the
validity of his experiments. Thus, if the experimental
results do not conform to the expectations generated by
existing theory, it is not the validity of the theory which
is questioned but the validity of the experiment [Ref. 1:
p. 270-1]. A number of explanations may account for
experimental discrepancies without impairing existing
theory.
In any case, experience has repeatedly shown that,
in overwhelming proportion, these discrepancies
disappear upon closer scrutiny. They may prove to be
instrumental effects, or they may result from previously
unnoticed approximations in the theory, or they may,
simply and mysteriously, cease to occur when the
experiment is repeated under slightly different
conditions. More often than not the efficient
procedure is therefore to decide that the problem has
"gone sour", that it presents hidden complexities, and
that it is time to put it aside in favor of another.
[Ref. 1: p. 202]
The assurance that existing theory provides the scientist--
i.e., that discrepancies can be accounted for within the
accepted framework of expectat ions--enables him to discount
the majority of discrepancies thereby preventing him from
being distracted or inundated by anomalies which "...occur
so regularly that no scientist could bring his research
problems to a conclusion if he paused for many of them."
[Ref. 1: p. 202]
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Not all discrepancies can be accounted for by the
existing theory, however. Over time, normal science will
generate anomalous data which, either by the weight of
incremental accumulation or by the imperative commanded by a
single central contradiction, will threaten the consensus
enjoyed by the existing theory. The affected specialist
community may then experience a period of crisis. The
existing theory has proven to be inadequate to account for
the anomalies and new theories are constructed and offered
as alternatives. This is a period of conflict in which the
old theory and new theories compete for the endorsement of
the specialist community. During such a period, the
alternative theories may be prolific and their overall
implication uncertain. What, then, is the process by which
the community adopts a new theory? Kuhn discusses five
characteristics which serve as primary criteria of
selection— accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and
fruitfulness [Ref. 1: p. 322]. These criteria are not
exclusive nor are they consistently weighted as to priority.
Competing theories may, for instance, offer similar degrees
of agreement with data determined within existing
instrumental capabilities. Such a situation occurred during





In their abstract structure and in the conceptual
entities they presuppose, these two theories are quite
different and, in fact, incompatible. But, during the
years when the two vied for the allegiance of the
scientific community, the theoretical predictions that
could be derived from them were very nearly the same.
[Ref. 1: p. 200]
As Kuhn points out, this is not an unusual dilemma to occur
during periods of conflict. For a theory to even be
considered by the scientific community its predictive
results must reasonably agree with previous experimental
data [Ref. 1: p. 201]. Other criteria must then be applied
in the individual scientist's selection of a theory. Since
criteria and priorities vary with the individual, group
allegiance to a new theory will evolve gradually and
increase as new supporting evidence is developed. Adherence
to the old theory may, however, prove tenacious, especially
among the older scientists steeped in the traditional image.
Max Planck noted that,
a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing
its opponents and making them see the light, but rather
because its opponents eventually die, and a new
generation grows up that is familiar with it. [Ref. 10:
p. 151]
Eventually, however, the scientific community will reach a
consensus and generate a revised shared image. Textbooks
are then rewritten to reflect the "new scientific truth" and
the legitimacy of the shared image is preserved.
In short, (textbooks) have to be rewritten in the
aftermath of each scientific revolution, and, once
rewritten, they inevitably disguise not only the role
but the very existence of the revolutions that produced
them. [Ref. 10: p. 137]
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This reformulation of the shared image then provides the
foundation for a new period of normal science.
Kuhn suggests that the scientific process is most
successful when normal science achieves an optimum balance
between inertial resistance to change and receptivity to
alternate theories. This balance is what Kuhn terms "the
essential tension"
. The inertia of the shared image
predominant in normal science is necessary both to structure
the research of the scientist and to provide a context in
which expectation and anomaly are relevant. While expec-
tations may suppress the perception of anomalies as in the
two experiments involving playing cards and cliches, it is
against the backdrop of expectations that anomalies finally
become apparent. Once apparent, the significance of the
anomaly must be weighed against the inertia of the community
image. If the inertial resistance is too great, alternative
theories will not be considered by the community. If the
inertial resistance is insufficient and alternative theories
are too readily considered, then the consensus will collapse
and the validity of a theory will not be fully tested or
exploited. [Ref. 1: pp. 234-5 and pp. 332-3]
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF NORMAL AND EXTRAORDINARY SCIENCES
The essential tension between inertia and change is
determined by the composition of the particular scientific
community. As previously noted, each scientist must measure
33

the desirability of competing theories against a value
system. This value system will be strongly influenced by
the scientist's indoctrination in the shared image; however,
personal characteristics will result in deviations from the
group norm [Ref. 1: p. 333]. Though scientific groups as a
whole tend to greater cohesiveness and lower tolerance to
change in comparison to other communities, these charac-
teristics will vary from one scientific group to another.
The disintegration and subsequent reformulation of consensus
therefore occurs incrementally at a rate determined by group
composition.
While consensus disintegration and reformulation occur
within a group context, the acknowledgement of anomaly and
the construction of alternate theories are dependent on the
characteristics of the individual scientist. Different
traits are conducive to normal and extraordinary periods of
research. Normal science is characterized by convergent
thought and a strong consensus. The shared image acts as a
lens focusing the efforts of the community on precise
problem areas with the focal resolution dependent on the
strength of consensus. The normal scientist, firmly
committed to the shared image, is adept at solving puzzles
through clever applications of that image rather than
devising revolutionary alternatives to the image. He is
able to focus his attention on specific problems without
being distracted by most anomalies.
34

A second characteristic of normal science is the
ingrained use of analogy to solve problems. As previously
discussed, paradigms both enhance the science student's
understanding of a general principle and provide him with
exemplars to apply in new situations. The use of paradigms,
then, in problem solving is a form of pattern recognicion.
Once a new problem is seen to be analogous to a problem
previously solved, both an appropriate formalism and a
new way of attaching its symbolic consequences to nature
follow. Having seen the resemblance, one simply uses
the attachments that have proved effective before. That
ability to recognize group-licensed resemblances is ...
the main thing students acquire by doing problems,
whether with pencil and paper or in a well-designed
laboratory. [Ref. 1: p. 306]
Proficiency at recognizing the similarities between new
problems and established patterns is therefore desirable in
normal science
.
Convergent thought, consensus, and pattern recognition
are attributes conducive to normal science and are the
traits reinforced by the traditional style of science
education. By expunging references to historical periods of
conflict, requiring rigorous indoctrination in accepted
theories, and exposing the science student to a paradigm
method of problem solution, the scientific community ensures
the continuation of a strong consensus. After admitting new
members into the scientific community, peer standards and




It is ... important that group unanimity be a paramount
value, causing the group to minimize the occasions for
conflict and to reunite quickly about a single set of
rules for puzzle solving even at the price of
subdividing the specialty or excluding a formerly
productive member. [Ref. 1: p. 291]
Normal science, then, is characteristically "... a highly
convergent activity based firmly upon a settled consensus
acquired from scientific education and reinforced by
subsequent life in the profession." [Ref. 1: p. 227]
The attributes conducive to extraordinary science are
quite different from those of normal science. The scientist
must perceive anomalies generated by normal research and
must be receptive to their possible implications. These are
traits associated with divergent thinking. The shared image
is not so deeply ingrained and perception of anomaly occurs
at a lower threshold. Having perceived the anomaly, the
divergent thinker, less secure in the validity of the shared
image, is more likely to be distracted and to investigate
the anomalous phenomenon. Upon investigation, most of these
anomalies will be accounted for by existing theory and
therefore have consumed the scientist's time and effort
without significant results. However, some anomalies will
bear the seeds of scientific revolution and initiate the
metamorphosis from normal to extraordinary science.
But not all anomalies do respond to minor adjustments of
the existing conceptual and instrumental fabric. Among
those that do not are some which, either because they
are particularly striking or because they are educed
repeatedly in many different laboratories, cannot be
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indefinitely ignored. Though they remain unassimilated
,
they impinge with gradually increasing force upon the
consciousness of the scientific community. [Ref. 1:
p. 262]
With the validity of the existing theory in doubt, the
scientist must create new theories. This form of creativity
differs from the creative ability of the normal scientist.
Rather than creatively applying the patterns of existing
theory, the scientist must escape the existing patterns and
construct a new image. The same data is reorganized to
reveal new relationships in a process similar to a shift in
visual gestalt [Ref. 10: p. 85]. "One central aspect of any
revolution is, then, that some of the similarity relations
change" [Ref. 10: p. 200] . Thus, while normal science is
characterized by proficiency in pattern recognition,
extraordinary science is characterized by proficiency in
pattern construction.
The ability to perceive anomaly and to construct
alternate theories is inversely related to the entrenchment
of the shared image. Typically, discoveries in the natural
sciences are attributed to scientists less acclimatized by
accepted theory [Ref. 12: pp. 497-559]. These are
scientists who have been sufficiently exposed to accepted
theory to appreciate the expectations of that theory,





almost always the man who achieve these fundamental
inventions of a new paradigm have been either very young
or very new to the field whose paradigm they change.
[Ref. 10: p. 90]
A strong commitment to the shared image, so vital to
normal science, therefore restrains extraordinary science in
three phases. First, it raises the threshold of perception
to exclude most anomalies. Second, it is more conducive to
pattern recognition than to pattern construction. And
third, it inhibits the community's acceptance of newly
constructed theories.
Both sets of characteristics, however, are essential to
maintaining the cyclical progress of scientific research.
Anomalies can emerge only within the context of normal
science and extended periods of normal research are
necessary preludes to periods of extraordinary science
[Ref. 1: p. 227]. The scientific community, then, must be
composed of both divergent and convergent thinkers for the
cycle of normal and extraordinary periods to occur. And,
since these two modes of thought are inevitably in
conflict, it will follow that the ability to support a
tension that can occasionally become almost unbearable
is one of the prime requisites for the very best sort of
scientific research. [Ref. 1: p. 226]
For a society seeking to maximize scientific progress,
given limited resources, the nature of this tension, and of
the scientific process in general, holds implications for
resource allocation and science management. The backbone of
the scientific community must be the cadre of normal
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scientists. The education of the science student should
therefore adhere to the traditional approach conducive to
firmly implanting a shared image. Admittance into the
scientific community should then be based on rigorous
standards and group approval— for, ultimately, the
scientific community is its own arbiter, "... (constituting)
a special subculture, one whose members are the exclusive
audience for, and judges of, each other's work" [Ref. 1:
p. 119]. The group, however, must be flexible enough to
tolerate a divergent element. This flexibility is exercised
not only in admitting divergent thinkers to the ranks of the
community, but in permitting a degree of lateral mobility
between scientific specialties and upward mobility for the
younger scientist.
There is no formula to dictate the optimum distribution
curve for the characteristics of tolerance and cohesiveness
that a scientific community should possess. As previously
noted, scientific groups tend to display a lower tolerance
to change and a greater cohesiveness than do other
professional communities; but specific distributions have
not been established. Guidelines, however, have been
suggested by economists for more efficient science
management. In a RAND corporation research study, Charles
Hitch and Roland McKean proffer the following guidelines for
military research and development management. First, the
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community should support some duplication of research effort
along diverse approaches. The areas of duplication should
be determined by a) the critical need in a specific research
area (e.g. the early development of the atom bomb), b) the
greater uncertainty (i.e. lack of consensus) in a given
area, c) the relative inexpense of the duplication ["There
should be more duplication, the cheaper it is to duplicate."
Ref. 13: p. 250], and d) the possibility of qualitatively
different alternatives accruing from duplication. As to the
number of diverse approaches to be supported,
no one knows enough to give precise answers. Some
original and suggestive theoretical analysis indicates
that in many circumstances there are greater gains from
pursuing two, three, or four paths, but rapidly
diminishing returns from further duplication. [Ref. 13:
p. 249]
Another guideline offered by Hitch and McKean is the
need to decentralize and to avoid premature overspeci f ica-
tion. The bureaucratic tendency to increase centralization
and direction is antithetical to handling the uncertainties
inherent in basic research. Thus,
1 the best person to decide what research work shall be
done is the man who is doing the research. The next
best is the head of the department. After that you
leave the field of best persons and meet increasingly
worse groups. The first of these is the research
director, who is probably wrong more than half the time.
Then comes a committee, which is wrong most of the time.
Finally, there is a committee of company vice-presidents
which is wrong all the time.' [Ref. 13: p. 254]
Hitch and McKean suggest other guidelines as well--such
as the advantages to be gained from competition and the need
40

for emphasis on the early stages of research—but the
critical element in these guidelines and in science
management in general remains elusive. What is the optimum
balance between convergent and divergent thinking to
maximize scientific advance? How much duplication should
then be encouraged without wasting resources? How much
independence should the scientist enjoy from the judgement
of his peers? All these questions relate to the "essential
tension" which Kuhn posits as the prime mover for scientific
advancement. While Kuhn's analysis does not provide a
quantitative means of determining the desirable level of
tension to be maintained, it does suggest the character-
istics which must be present in the scientific community for
a tension to exist. Thus it is possible to consider if a
particular scientific community displays those character-
istics necessary for rapid scientific progress.
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Ill- THl permeability of science
The mechanism of scientific progress described in the
previous chapter reveals several points at which science is
permeable to cultural influences. Culture affects both the
characteristics internal to the scientific community and
those of the parent society in which the scientific
community functions. Within the scientific community,
culture significantly affects the distribution patterns of
tolerance and cohesiveness traits. Within the larger
society/ culture influences the type of support that society
will grant and the requirements it will levy upon the
scientific community. These internal and external cultural
influences may radically skew the community's ability to
generate and maintain a level of tension sufficient for
scientific progress.
A. UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE INDEX
Various indices have been developed to compare cultural
norms. One such index compares the tolerance for uncer-
tainty that is characteristic of different cultures [Ref.
14: pp. 153-212]. In this context, the uncertainty of the
future generates anxiety levels within a society.
Different societies have adapted to uncertainty in
different ways. Ways of coping with uncertainty belong
to the cultural heritage of societies and they are
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transferred and reinforced through basic institutions
like the family, the school, and the state. They are
reflected in collectively held values of the members of
a particular society. Their roots are non-rational, and
they may lead to collective behavior in one society
which may seem aberrant and incomprehensible to members
of other societies. [Ref. 14: p. 154]
Thus, cultures with low tolerance construct social
mechanisms to reduce the threat of uncertainty. Tables III
[Ref. 14: p. 184] and IV [Ref. 14: pp. 176-7] list some of
the characteristics and social mechanisms associated with
low tolerance (high uncertainty avoidance) and high
tolerance (low uncertainty avoidance) cultures.
Several attributes relating to uncertainty avoidance are
relevant to the scientific process. Consensus, a funda-
mental element for normal science, is ascribed to cultures
with low tolerance for uncertainty. High tolerance
cultures, on the other hand, display many of the attributes
conducive to extraordinary scientific advancement. These
high tolerance cultures abide by the conflict, competition,
and risk inherent to periods of extraordinary scientific
research. In addition, greater job mobilitiy, both upward
and lateral, is characteristic of high tolerance cultures,
thus encouraging the fresh outlook necessary to extra-
ordinary science. Low tolerance cultures, then, generate
convergent characteristics which support normal science but
inhibit extraordinary science; while high tolerance




The Uncertainty Avoidance Societal Norms
LOW UAI HIGH UAI
* The uncertainty inherent
in life is more easily
accepted and each day is
taken as it comes.
* Ease, lower stress.
* Time is free.
* Hard work is not a virtue
per se .
* Weaker superegos.
* Aggressive behavior is
frowned upon.
* Less showing of emotions.
* Conflict and competition
can be contained on the
level of fair play and used
constructively.
* The uncertainty inherent in
life is felt as a continuous
threat that must be fought.
* Higher anxiety and stress.
* Time is money.
* Inner urge to work hard.
* Strong superegos.
* Aggressive behavior of self
and others is accepted.
* More showing of emotions.
* Conflict and competition
can unleash aggression and
should therefore be avoided
* More acceptance of dissent. * Strong need for consensus.





* More positive toward
younger people.
* Less conservatism.
* More willingness to take
risks in life.
* Achievement determined in
terms of recognition.
* Deviant persons and ideas
are dangerous; intolerance.
* Nationalism.
* Younger people are suspect.
* Conservatism, law and order.
* Concern with security in
life.





Low UAI High UAI
* Relativism, empiricism. * Search for ultimate, absolute
truths and values.
* There should be as few * Need for written rules and
rules as possible. regulations.
* If rules cannot be kept, * If rules cannot be kept, we
we should change them. are sinners and should
repent
.
* Belief in generalists and * Belief in experts and their
common sense. knowledge.
* The authorities are there * Ordinary citizens are
to serve the citizens. incompetent versus the
author i ties
.




A Summary of Connotations of Uncertainty Avoidance
Index Differences Found in Survey Research
Low UAI Countries High UAI Countries
* Lower anxiety level in
population
.
* Greater readiness to live
by the day.
* Lower job stress.
* Less emotional resistance
to change.
* Less hesitation to change
employers
.
* Loyalty to employer is not
seen as a virtue
.
* Preference for smaller
organizations as employers
* Smaller generation gap.
* Lower average age in
higher level jobs.
* Managers should be




* Hope of success.
* More risk-taking.
* Stronger ambition for
individual advancement.
* Higher anxiety level in
population
.
* More worry about the future.
* Higher job stress.
* More emotional resistance to
change
.
* Tendency to stay with the
same employer
.
* Loyalty to employer is seen
as a virtue.
* Preference for larger
organizations as employers.
* Greater generation gap.
* Higher average age in
higher level jobs:
gerontocracy.
* Managers should be selected
on the basis of seniority.
* Less achievement motivation.
* Fear of failure.
* Less risk-taking.






Low UAI Countries High UAI Countries
* Prefers manager career over * Prefers specialist career over
specialist career. manager career.
* A manager need not be an * A manager must be an expert
expert in the field he in the field he manages,
manages
.
* Hierarchical structures of * Hierarchical structures of
organizations can be organizations should be
by-passed. clear and respected.
* Preference for broad * Preference for clear
guidelines. requirements and instructions.
* Rules may be broken for * Company rules should not be
pragmatic reasons. broken.
* Conflict in organizations * Conflict in organizations is
is natural. undesirable.
* Competition between * Competition between employees
employees can be fair and is emotionally disapproved of.
r ight
.
* More sympathy for * Ideological appeal of
individual and authorita- consensus and of consultative
tive decisions. leadership.
* Delegation to subordinates * However, initiative of
can be complete. subordinates should be kept
under control
.
* Higher tolerance for * Lower tolerance for ambiguity
ambiguity in perceiving in perceiving others,
others .
* More prepared to compromise * Lower readiness to compromise
with opponents. with opponents.
* Acceptance of foreigners * Suspicion toward foreigners as
as managers. managers.
* Larger fraction prepared * Fewer people prepared to live




Low UAI Countries High UAI Countries
* Higher tolerance for
ambiguity in looking at
own job.
* Citizens optimism about
ability to control
politicians' decisions.
* Employee optimism about
the motives behind company
activities .




* Lower tolerance for ambiguity
in looking at own job.
* Citizens pessimism about
ability to control
politicians' decisions.
* Employee pessimism about the
motives behind company
activities .









extraordinary science but may yield insufficient cohesive-
ness to support normal science.
B. HIGH AND LOW CONTEXT CULTURES
Anthropologist Edward Hall provides another index with
which to compare cultures [Ref. 15]. In Hall's analysis,
cultures can be compared against a continuum ranging from
high to low context. Hall suggests that higher contexture
is related to greater pattern recognition capacities [Ref.
15: p. 120]. This pattern recognition process is reflected
in the communication styles of high and low context
cultures. Low context communications are linear, explicit,
and detailed. In contrast,
(High context) transactions feature preprogrammed
information that is in the receiver and in the setting,
with only minimal information in the transmitted
message.... (High context) communication ... is
economical, fast efficient, and satisfying; however,
time must be devoted to programming. If this
programming does not take place, the communication is
incomplete. [Ref. 15: p. 101]
High context cultures, then, hinge on a strong indoctri-
nation in a shared image. Assured of the mutuality of this
image, high context interactions can assume pattern
relationships based on fewer cues.
... (The) only way to increase information-handling
capacity without increasing the mass and complexity of
the system is to program the memory of the system so
that less information is required to activate the
system, i.e., make it more like the couple that has
been married for thirty-five years. [Ref. 15: pp. 85-6]
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High context cultures, then, are compatible with normal
science. The integral role of the shared image and the
heavy utilization of pattern recognition are traits common
to both normal science and high context cultures. This
commonality implies that high context cultures are less
conducive to extraordinary science. "(High context) actions
are by definition rooted in the past, slow to change, and
highly stable" [Ref. 15: p. 93]. Low context systems, on
the other hand, are more receptive to change and to new
ideas
.
Those of us in the West who are used to having to
struggle with the complexities of (low context) systems
can, when we are confronted with something new, be quite
creative about it and not require an inordinate amount
of detailed programming. (High context) people can be
creative within their own system but have to move to
the bottom of the context scale when dealing with
anything new, whereas (low context) people can be quite
creative and innovative when dealing with the new but
have trouble being anything but pedestrian when working
within the bounds of old systems. [Ref. 15: p. 127]
Thus, the creativity of the high context scientist is that
of the puzzle solver proficient at pattern recognition;
while the creativity of the low context scientist is in
constructing new patterns.
C. THE JAPANESE EXAMPLE
Comparing cultures, Hall considers the United States to
fall toward the low end of the context scale while Japan
falls at the high context end. Makoto Kikuchi , director of
the Sony Research Center in Yokohama, Japan, provides an
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analysis of Japan's research style which illustrates the
impact of high context culture on a society's scientific
capability. In his analysis, Kikuchi attributes Japan's
impressive success in exploiting solid-state electronics
technology to their style of scientific research. He
considers four cultural factors to significantly influence
this style— consensus, pattern recognition capability,
education techniques, and flexibility. Consensus is
intrinsic to the Japanese culture. Kikuchi likens Japanese
society to a set of small stones closely connected by strong
springs (Figure 4) . More individualistic societies, such as
the United States, are represented by large stones only
loosely connected. The size of the stones indicates the
importance of the individual relative to society as a whole.
The strength of the springs represents the degree of social
cohesion
.
If you agitate one corner of a network like the one in
Figure (4)a, everything will start to oscillate within a
short time. "Consensus," represented by an in-phase
oscillation of the entire system will soon be attained,
and the time constant for information propagation will
be short. In a network like Figure (4)b, on the other
hand, when you agitate one corner the large mass of the
stones and the weakness of the springs defeat any
attempt to induce a system-wide oscillation. [Ref. 16:
P. 45]
One of the significant factors shaping the Japanese style of






Source: "Creativity and Ways of Thinking: The Japanese Style,"
Physics Today




The second element which Kikuchi considers is pattern
recognition. Research suggests that Japanese possess a
stronger pattern recognition capability while Americans are
stronger in numerical and logical operations [Ref. 16: pp.
48-9]
.
Pattern recognition is another quality necessary for
normal science
.
Education in Japan reinforces consensus and pattern
recognition capabilities. Kikuchi points out that the
Japanese word "manabu" (to learn) was originally "manebu"
(to imitate) [Ref. 16: p. 44]. The traditional method of
learning through imitation is reflected in the current style
of education. Memorization and homogeneity are emphasized
at the expense of independent creative thinking.
Education is very homogenous in Japan. Courses and text
books for the primary and high schools are carefully
standardized so that students are taught the same things
to the same level at the same time of the year from
Hokkaido to Okinawa. [Ref. 16: p. 44]
Entrance examination are a primary concern in the Japanese
system and dominate the student's education.
Skills for passing examinations ... consist of
memorizing a large number of sophisticated problems and
remembering a long list of "keys" for solving the trick
questions that examiners are fond of setting. [Ref. 16:
p. 44]
The Japanese system with its stress on homogeneity and
memorization is an effective mechanism for inculcating a
shared image. The examination process using "large numbers
of sophisticated problems" and "keys" trains the student to
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use paradigm-based solutions and relies heavily on his
ability to recognize patterns, given only a few cues. This
style of education is a version of the traditional science
education fundamental to normal science.
These three factors—consensus, pattern recognition, and
education style—provide the Japanese with a strong basis
for conducting normal science. With only these qualities,
the Japanese would excel at the exploitation and application
of existing theory but would be unlikely to accomplish the
quantum jumps to new theories characteristic of extra-
ordinary science. The cultural factors conducive to normal
science do not encourage the type of divergent creativity
necessary to make those types of theoretical breakthroughs.
. . . (The) education system in Japan does not leave
much, if any, time for the development of independent
thinking.... This characteristic, socially and
historically based, may be restricting creativity in
Japan, particularly creativity that would lead science
and technology in new directions. [Ref. 16: p. 45]
The fourth factor strongly influencing the Japanese
style of research, however, ensures that the Japanese will
not stagnate at the level of normal science. This is the
characteristic which Kikuchi calls flexibility. Flexi-
bility, in this context, refers to the Japanese ability
"... to absorb elements of foreign culture that are very
different from our own--but with suitable modifications"
[Ref. 16: p. 42], Although not likely to initiate
breakthroughs, their flexibility enables the Japanese to
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rapidly assimilate new theories which are foreign generated.
Once an externally produced idea finds access to the
Japanese system, the system quickly attains in-phase
oscillation as previously described. This consensus
process, in conjunction with their proficiency at normal
research, has allowed the Japanese to rapidly catch up with
the United States in the field of solid-state electronics.
... "Catch-up" activities of this kind are very suited
to Japanese engineers and scientists.... The Japanese
are strong when they have a target to work on, whereas
Western societies are stronger at finding new directions
with a certain spirit of adventure. So the papers by
Western authors show a preference for a way of thinking
and analysis related to fundamental principles, and
Japanese researchers concentrate more on sophisticated,
detailed approaches to existing problems. [Ref. 16:
pp. 43 and 45]
The Japanese scientific style provides an example of a
scientific community internally skewed by cultural factors
toward normal science. In addition, cultural character-
istics determine the Japanese 1 receptivity to externally
generated breakthroughs, followed by rapid group conversion
and consensus reformulation. Thus, cultural factors have
significantly contributed to Japan's successful competition
in high technology areas.
D. THE PARENT SOCIETY
Cultural influences emanate not only through the
internal composition of the scientific community, but also
through the external pressures exerted by the parent
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society. To some extent, the scientific community enjoys a
degree of insulation from the larger society [Ref. 1: p.
119]. As noted in the previous chapter, scientists are the
primary authorities judging the validity of each other's
work. But the scientific community is dependent on the
resources allocated by society and must function within the
restraints imposed by that society. Resource allocations
determine which scientific areas receive funds, equipment,
and personnel. Cultural priorities, then, influence this
distribution and the potential rate of scientific progress
in different fields. These priorities, for instance, may
emphasize military requirements at the expense of research
applicable to civilian sectors. Culture may also determine
the acceptability of a line of research. Thus, genetic
engineering or the development of artificial intelligence
may be suppressed as immoral or threatening to society.
Cultures with a low tolerance for uncertainty may be less
likely to accept the risks and costs associated with
extraordinary science and divergent research efforts. Nobel
prize winner Albert Szent-Gyorgyi describes the dilemma
faced by the "Dionysian" scientist seeking to pursue
divergent lines of research.
Support mostly takes the form of grants, and the
present methods of distributing grants unduly favors the
Apollonian. Applying for a grant begins with writing a
project. The Apollonian clearly sees the future lines
of his research and has no difficulty writing a clear
project. Not so the Dionysian, who knows only the
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direction in which he wants to go out into the unknown;
he has no idea what he's going to find there and how
he's going to find it. Defining the unknown or writing
down the subconscious is a contradiction in absurdum.
[Ref. 15: p. 124]
Szent-Gyorgyi solved his dilemma by preparing false project
proposals to acquire funds for the research he actually
intended to pursue. Cultural characteristics of the parent
society, then, influence the direction of scientific
research
.
The parent society may also impose general conditions on
the scientific community which are culturally motivated. In
the Japanese example previously discussed, the cultural
trait of flexibility assured an influx of new ideas to the
system. Xenophobic cultures, on the other hand, may reject
the infusion of foreign concepts or restrict the scientific
community's access to foreign scientists. Pervasive
cultural phobias may even affect the interaction between
indigenous scientific communities. Thus capitalist
industrial research requires a measure of secrecy to
preserve the competitive edge. Similar restrictions are
associated with military research and national security
requirements. The extent of these restrictions and the
areas of application will vary with the characteristics of
the parent culture.
Scientific progress, then, is highly dependent on the
cultural characteristics of the scientific community and the
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parent society. These characteristics will influence the
balance struck between convergent and divergent tendencies
within the scientific community and the resultant level of
tension propelling scientific progress. In addition,
culture will influence the relationship between the
scientific community and the parent society which also
affects the rate and direction of scientific advancement.
This permeability of the scientific process to cultural
factors is a major determinant in a nation's scientific
style. Thus, in analyzing the Soviet capability to pursue
scientific research, the impact of Russian culture on the





IV. THE STRUCTURE OF SOVIET SCIENCE
Organizational structures manifest cultural charac-
teristics. Organizations not only are shaped by the
cultural milieu from which they emerge but, by the
durability and inertia which they tend to acquire vis-a-vis
the individual, organizational structures also serve to
perpetuate and reinforce the characteristics which molded
them. Organizational structure, then, is an important
factor determining the impact of Russian culture on Soviet
science
.
Soviet science involves a multitude of organizations
interacting hierarchically and bureaucratically . In
general, broad policy guidelines for science are determined
by the organs of the Communist Party— the Politburo,
Secretariat, and Central Committee. These policies are then
endorsed by the Supreme Soviet and administered by the
Council of Ministers. State committees subordinate to the
Council formulate the policy guidelines into plans,
coordinating budget and resource allocations to the scien-
tific communities dispersed within three major sectors--the
academies of sciences, the industrial branch ministries, and
the higher educational institutions. Figure 5 [Ref. 17:
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organizations. As indicated, this structure is mirrored in
the republic governments with the republic Councils of
Ministers, academies, and higher educational institutes
subordinate to their USSR counterparts.
Ideally, this system is designed to integrate research
and development into a centrally controlled plan maximizing
national production. Various factors, however, have impeded
this integration. In the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union
considered structural revisions to improve the integration
of science and technology into the national economic plan
[Ref. 17: pp. 251-97]. In 1965 the State Committee for
Science and Technology (GKNT) was formed to coordinate
science policy in pursuit of structural solutions. While
the formal relationships depicted in Figure 5 have not been
altered, the nature of these relationships have changed over
the past two decades as the GKNT, and other structural
revisions, gained influence in the system. The structure of
Soviet science continues to evolve as the Soviet Union
attempts to optimize technological integration in the
production cycle. These organizations, their current
relationships, and their evolution will be discussed below.
A. THE COMMUNIST PARTY
Science policy is determined at the highest government
and Party levels of the Soviet Union. The organizations at
this level are the Politburo, Secretariat, and Central
61

Committee of the Communist Party, and the Supreme Soviet and
Council of Ministers of the Soviet government. The
relationship between the Party and government is complex;
however, the authority of the Party, though informal, is
preeminent
.
In the Soviet Union, there is a separation of policy
formulation from policy execution. The former is the
prerogative of the Communist Party while the latter is
the responsibility of the government. This should not be
understood to mean that the Party does not take part in
the implementation and the government does not assist in
planning. There are cross lines between the two--
organizationally and through key persons holding dominant
positions in both Party and government. [Ref. 18: p. 17]
The Politburo provides broad guidelines for the economy,
science, and technology. The operation of the Politburo
epitomizes several characteristics of the Soviet style of
government--rule by committee, reliance on a strong overall
consensus, unaminous pronouncements preceded by unpublicized
internal debates, and gerontocracy. In addition to these
characteristics, several members of the Politburo possess
technocratic backgrounds. In 1979, nine of the thirteen
full members had graduated from technical or scientific
educational institutes. These included L. I. Brezhnev
(metallurgy training at Dnepropetrovski ) , Yu. V. Andropov
(Marine Transportation Institute) , and the general
secretary, K. U. Chernenko (Gomel Auto Highway Technical
Institute) [Ref. 19: pp. 12-3]. In 1975, General Secretary
Brezhnev delineated the Party's role in science policy
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formulation in an address to the Academy of Sciences on its
250th birthday.
We have no intention of dictating to you the details of
research topics— that is a matter for the scientists
themselves. But the basic directions of the development
of science, the main tasks that life pose, will be
determined jointly. [Ref. 17: p. 133]
The Party's influence in this joint determination is
pervasive. The Secretariat of the Central Committee can
intervene in the ministries and other agencies to ensure
adherence to both ideological principles and approved
research plans. Several departments within the Secretariat
provide day-to-day operational coordination. These include
the Departments of Science and Higher Educational
Institutions, Defense Industry, Heavy Industry, Chemical
Industry, and Planning and Finance. Party influence at the
lower levels is exercised through the Party cells associated
with each research institute. [Ref. 17: pp. 24-5; and Ref.
19: p. 12]
The Central Committee of the Communist Party exerts
party influence through its control of personnel selection.
Nominees to major positions, such as directors of important
research institutes, leaders of sectors, and deans of
universities, are screened and approved by the Central
Committee. Through this mechanism, the Central Committee
affects research institutes at the union, republic, and




Another Party organ influencing science policy is the
Committee for State Security (KGB) . The KGB exercises
authority in four areas affecting scientific research by:
1) censorship of scientific publications; 2) having KGB
representatives in all scientific organizations; 3) control
of travel by Soviet scientists; and 4) control of travel by
visiting scientists [Ref. 19: pp. 4 and 13]. Thus the Party
influences Soviet science by determining basic policy,
selecting key personnel for science related organizations,
controlling science publications and access to foreign
scientists, and permeating science organizations with Party
representatives to ensure compliance with Party directives.
B. THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT
While the Party determines basic policy and oversees its
implementation, the Soviet Government is formally charged
with executing that policy. The highest government organ is
the Supreme Soviet. The unwieldy size of the Soviet (1500
members) and the infrequency of its meetings (six to seven
days a year) preclude an active role in policy formulation
or execution. Instead, the Supreme Soviet serves to endorse
and legitimize the policies of the Communist Party and their
formulation into national plans by the Council of Ministers.
The Council of Ministers administers the Soviet
ministries and other government agencies. The Council is
composed of approximately 100 members including ministers,
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chairmen of state committees, and the fifteen chairmen of
the republic Councils of Ministers. Members of the Council
are also members of the Party Central Committee [Ref. 17:
pp. 24 and 28]. Control in the Council is centralized in
its thirteen member Presidium. As with the Politburo, many
of the members have technical backgrounds and four of the
state committees associated with science and technology are
represented on the Presidium [Ref. 17: p. 30; and Ref. 19:
p. 14]. This level of participation in both the Presidium
and Politburo led John Turkevich to comment that "... in no
other country is science represented at such a high level in
policy formulation" [Ref. 18: p. 22].
Directly subordinate to the Council of Ministers are
the state committees, the all-union and union republic
ministries, the republic Councils of Ministers, and the USSR
Academy of Sciences. While science administration falls
under the purview of the ministries, academy, and republic
governments, the state committees provide services which
cross ministerial and departmental lines. These services
include planning, finance, and supply [Ref. 17: pp. 29 and
35]. Of the fourteen state committees, those primarily
involved in science and technology are the State Committee
for Science and Technology (GKNT) , the State Planning
Committee (Gosplan) , the State Committee for Material and
Technical Supply (Gossnab) , the State Committee for
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Construction Affairs (Gosstroy) , the State Committee for
Inventions and Discoveries (Goskomi zobreteniya) , the State
Committee for Standards (Gosstandart) , and the State Bank
(Gosbank) [Ref. 17: pp. 29-30]. Of these, the State
Committee for Science and Technology and the State Planning
Committee exert the greatest influence on Soviet science and
technology. The other committees respond to the directives
provided by Gosplan. The State Committee for Material and
Technical Supply provides supplies to the industries,
academies, and universities. The State Committee for
Construction Affairs coordinates the construction and
renovation of research facilities as well as the
introduction of technical innovations into construction
practices. The State Committee for Standards introduces and
monitors industrial standards of production. The increasing
precision of these standards is one of the mechanisms
intended to encourage technical innovation in production.
The State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries issues
author certificates and patents and disseminates information
about inventions nationally [Ref. 17: pp. 43-45].
The State Committee for Science and Technology
coordinates the science and technology activities of the
other committees and government agencies. the GKNT was
established in 1965 as part of the Soviet leadership's
efforts to integrate science policy more closely with
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national production designs. The GKNT had gradually assumed
some of the traditional responsibilities of the USSR Academy
of Sciences in determining national science policy. This
was especially true in planning applied research, but the
State Committee's authority over the science and technology
components of the State Budget endows the GKNT with
considerable influence in all facets of research [Ref. 18:
pp. 45-6; and Ref. 20: p. 213]. The GKNT prepares inputs
relating to science and technology for the annual and five-
year State Plans for Development of the National Economy in
coordination with Gosplan, the USSR Academy of Sciences, the
Ministry of Finance, the USSR ministries, and the union
republic Councils of Ministers [Ref. 17: pp. 93-4]. In
addition to negotiating State Budget expenditures for the
entire scientific community, the GKNT directly controls the
allocation of approximately 30 percent of those expenditures
to research performers involved in high priority science and
technology research [Ref. 17: p. 95]. The GKNT, with
Gosplan and the USSR Academy of Sciences, also compiles this
list of 200 to 250 problems for inclusion in the five-year
plans [Ref. 17: p. 114; and Ref. 18: p. 46]. Another
important resource controlled by the GKNT is a two to three
percent reserve of the annual budget allocation to science
which the Committee can distribute to important research
projects on short notice [Ref. 17: p. 99; and Ref. 19:
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p. 17]. These budgetary controls provide the Committee with
a powerful mechanism for influencing science policy.
The structure of the GKNT is shown in Figure 6 [Ref. 19:
p. 18]. The Committee is relatively small with approxi-
mately 70 members on the full Committee and 16 members in
the GKNT's executive body, the collegium. Approximately
one-third of the Committee members are also members of the
USSR Academy of Sciences or other academies [Ref. 17: pp.
37-8; and Ref. 19: p. 16]. The permanent staff of the
Committee is only about 600, however, approximately forty to
sixty scientific councils addressing various high priority
problems provide the Committee with the voluntary assistance
of some 5,500 persons including influential scientists,
industrial managers, and research specialists [Ref. 17: p.
38; Ref. 18: p. 46; and Ref. 19: p. 16]. Only a few
institutes are directly subordinate to the GKMT, and these
are primarily concerned with information dissemination and
science management rather than laboratory research. These
institutes include the Institute of Technical Esthetics, the
Ail-Union Scientific and Technical Information Center
(VNTIT) , the Institute of Systems Research, and the All-
Union Institute of Scientific and Technical Information
(VINITI). The latter institutes are jointly managed by the
GKNT and the USSR Academy of Sciences [Ref. 18: p. 46; and
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as its function is to acquire and disseminate foreign
technology publications.
The State Committee for Science and Technology, then,
coordinates the national science and technology efforts
across academy, ministerial, and educational jurisdictions.
To achieve this coordination, the GKNT negotiates and
formulates the science expenditure portions of the annual
State Budget and establishes science and technology goals
for the annual, five-year, and long range plans. With these
powers, the GKNT can significantly influence the direction
of Soviet science policy.
The other state committee significantly affecting
science policy is the State Planning Committee (Gosplan)
.
Gosplan coordinates the inputs of other state committees,
ministries, republic governments, and government agencies
into the final annual budget and five-year and long range
plans. These plans are submitted to the Council of
Ministers, Supreme Soviet, and Politburo for legislative
approval. Gosplan then translates the general policy
directives provided by the Party and Council of Ministers
into allocations of material and financial resources. This
requires Gosplan to balance the needs of the economy and
national defense while preserving the intent of communist
ideology. Thus,
in addition to five-yearly plans, the Gosplan formulates
both long-range and yearly plans, intended to assure a
proportional development of the national economy,
continued growth, and increased efficiency of the
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national industry in order to increase the standard of
living and strengthen national defense. Gosplan
attempts to base plans on contemporary accomplishments
and progress in science and technology on the results of
scientific investigations of the economic and social
problems of communism and a comprehensive study of
social demands. [Ref. 18: p. 27]
Science expenditures, overall wages, material and financial
outlays for research projects, and construction and
renovation investments are provided in the national annual
plan. [Ref. 17: p. 93]
C. CENTRAL PLANNING
Formulation of the annual budget and five-year plans
involves the full hierarchy of organizations. The Politburo
and Council of Ministers issue general directives for the
plan. The directives are then developed into more detailed
and comprehensive objectives by the GKNT, USSR Academy of
Sciences, and Gosplan. Then,
preliminary plan assignments ... are transmitted
down the respective hierarchies—Academy , ministry,
republic—to the performing organizations. ...(These)
establishments prepare draft plans which are routed up
through the hierarchy, aggregated at each stage. They
are considered and reconciled (with bargaining) by the
triad of central management organs (GKNT, Academy, and
Gosplan).... Plans are then approved by the Council of
Ministers and the Politburo, approved by the Supreme
Soviet, and transmitted down the administrative ladder
with formal and official plan assignments specified at
each level. [Ref. 17: p. 130]
Central planning carries powerful implications for
Soviet science policy, though there is ample room for
bureaucratic interpretation and misdirection in formulating
and exercising the national plans. Central planning
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encourages conservatism both in the directives issued from
the top governmental organs and in the plan proposals
submitted by the performing establishments.
The Soviet system is particularly incremental. The
tendency to plan from the achieved level reflects an
"add on" approach to design that encourages scaling up
existing processes rather than developing new ones and
sees continuity as the best guarantee of meeting planned
output goals. [Ref. 17: p. 316]
In attempting to develop long range comprehensive plans
for science and technology, the USSR Academy of Sciences and
the GKNT in 1973 began developing a 15 year plan,
"Comprehensive Program of Science and Technology Progress
and Its Social and Economic Consequences for 1976-1990."
This program is still under development and has not been
approved by the Party; however, a major aspect of the
program is that the projects addressed are premised on
scientific and technological achievements [Ref. 17: p. 271].
This has caused consternation among some Soviet planners
that "... (the) conservative approach to building the future
entirely on the accomplishments of today, no matter how
high, will only lead to 'planned obsolescence'." [Ref. 17:
p. 272]
Once approved, the annual plan has the force of law,
thereby encouraging conservatism at the performer level as
well. The incentives of the system are such that the




The work of both individuals and institutions is
evaluated primarily in terms of their formal fulfillment
of the thematic and financial plans, not on the basis of
the real value of their S&T achievements. There is a
strong tendency therefore to propose "safe" and
relatively minor themes, whose parameters are fairly
well known and results more certain. [Ref. 17: p. 237]
After the plan is promulgated, there is little flexibility
to adjust to the unforeseen pitfalls and opportunities of
scientific research.
Only rarely are superior bodies inclined to permit
alterations in annual plan targets. They discourage the
raising and reducing of targets because such actions can
reverberate and disrupt the economy. The plan is thus
ambitious and inflexible: this consideration alone
fosters conservatism and works against unpredictable
activities like R&D. [Ref. 17: p. 176]
The budgetary system incorporated in the annual plan
also affects Soviet science. Research performers receive
financing either directly from the State Budget or from
contractual agreements with industrial or other agencies,
funds received from contractual agreements account for
approximately fifty percent of science expenditures, and
primarily support applied research activities. The State
Budget grants are those funds from the national plan
negotiated by the GKNT for science expenditures. These
funds account for the other fifty percent of science expen-
ditures and go to basic research activities. Approximately
thirty percent of the State Budget grants for research and
development is controlled by the GKNT for allocation to
research performers based on their participation in the 200
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to 250 basic problem areas delineated in the national plans.
Seventy percent of the State Budget funds for science
expenditures are distributed directly to the ministries, the
USSR Academy of Sciences, and other research performers as
block grants, to be used and further distributed at their
discretion [Ref. 17: pp. 94-5]. This discretion is not
total, however, as the national plan not only lists 200 to
250 basic science and technology problems of high national
priority, but also fundamental research problems to be
addressed by the natural and social sciences.
The R&D targets are divided for national planning into
fundamental problems of chemistry, physics, mathematics,
biology, geology, social sciences and humanities, branch
problems in improvement of production, territorial pro-
blems in the development of production forces, and inter-
regional and inter-branch problems. [Ref. 18: p. 29]
Overall, central planning may account for up to fifty
percent of research and development project selections,
ministerial planning for approximately thirty percent, and
local planning for the remainder. [Ref. 17: pp. 116 and
119]
The implications of the Soviet budget process are
twofold. Block funding provides the institution with a
stable income which permits long term planning and research
continuity. On the other hand, this stability reduces
organizational dynamics.
Conservative tendencies stifle creativity and change.
The inertia of institutions and projects is hard to break.
R&D facilities and programs can go for years without
producing signficant results. [Ref. 17: p. 306]
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The resulting rigidity of established science institutes
also obstructs the incorporation of new projects and fields
of research. In many instances, new research institutes are
established to pursue projects and fields of interest to top
Party and government organizations rather than charging
established institutes with their responsibility.
In practice, it is easier to create a new R&D facility
than to transform an old one. This option, however,
which has been frequently used, is less viable today
given the constraints on resources and need for
intensive development of both science and technology.
[Ref. 17: p. 266]
Central planning and budgetary methods have the
potential advantage of permitting long term, comprehensive
science and technology development. The current Soviet
system, however, encourages incremental scientific research
and bureaucratic inertia.
D. RESEARCH PERFORMERS
There are three broad categories of research performers
in Soviet science. These are the academies of sciences, the
industrial branch ministries, and the higher educational
institutions (universities and VUZy) . The academies and
educational institutes conduct the majority of basic
research activities while industrial institutes concentrate
on applied research. This breakdown is shown in Figure 7
[Ref. 19: p. 10]. The GKNT and Gosplan formulate plans for














































































































industrial and educational research activities. The USSR
Academy of Sciences has somewhat greater autonomy and, in
cooperation with GKNT and Gosplan, has primary responsi-
bility for directing fundamental research based on Party
directives
.
1 . The Academies of Sciences
There is a network of academies of sciences in the
Soviet Union, of which the USSR Academy of Sciences (AN SSR)
is the senior and most prestigious. These academies fall
into three categories— the USSR Academy of Sciences, the
republic academies, and specialized academies. The USSR
Academy of Sciences is subordinate to the USSR Council of
Ministers, while the republic and specialized academies are
subordinate to both their respective republic Councils of
Ministers or ministries and the USSR Academy. For these
academies, the appropriate Council of Ministers or ministry
provides funding and administrative guidance and the USSR
Academy coordinates research planning. The Presidium of the
USSR Academy approves the final annual plan prepared by each
research institute [Ref. 19: p. 25]. These relationships
are shown in Figure 8 [Ref. 19: p. 31].
Overall, the academies employ approximately nine
percent of the Soviet scientific workers and receive eight
percent of all science expenditures [Ref. 17: p. 46]. Of
these expenditures, approximately ninety-two percent is from
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State Budget grants and eight percent from contractual
agreements [Ref. 19: p. 68]. The strengths of the various
academies in terms of membership and the numbers of scien-
tific establishments controlled by each, are shown in
Table V [Ref. 19: p. 32]. In addition to being signifi-
cantly smaller, the republic academies are generally more
specialized and industrially oriented than the USSR Academy
[Ref. 17: p. 49] .
The USSR Academy of Science is both the nucleus of
this network and the organizational pattern for the republic
academies. Its organization is shown in Figure 9 [Ref. 19:
p. 33]. The General Assembly, composed of 245 full members,
447 corresponding members, and 68 foreign members, meets
only twice a year for several days. Despite this restric-
tion, the General Assembly retains considerable power in its
authority to elect the president, vice president, and
members of the Academy Presidium as well as new full and
corresponding members of the General Assembly by secret
ballot [Ref. 19: pp. 32-3]. The tradition of election by
secret ballot has enabled the USSR Academy to preserve some
autonomy from Party influence, even to the extent of
refusing membership to many candidates proposed by the
Party. However, while the first four presidents of the
Academy were not Party members, the election of Party
members as the last two presidents may indicate greater




Network of Soviet Academies (December 1975)
Year Number of Number of


















USSR Academy of Sciences 1724 673
Union-Republic Academies
Ukrainian SSR 1919 282
Belorussian SSR 1928 131
Georgian SSR 1941 109
Lithuanian SSR 1941 39
Uzbek SSR 1943 96
Armenian SSR 1943 90
Kazakh SSR 1945 132
Azerbaijan SSR 1945 90
Latvian SSR 1946 52
Estonian SSR 1946 44
Tadzhik SSR 1951 42
Turkmen SSR 1951 49
Kirghiz SSR 1954 44
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The USSR Academy of Sciences
FIGURE 9

The Academy's general policies historically have
been significantly influenced by Party directives. In the
late twenties, the Party ensured the election of Party
members, particularly engineers, into the Academy to shift
the Academy's focus from basic to applied science. The
emphasis on applied research continued into the late 1950s,
when Krushchev supported debates between the scientists and
engineers over the Academy's role. These debates culminated
in 1961, when over forty percent of the Academy's science
establishments were transferred to control by industrial
ministries [Ref. 18: p. 47]. The Academy's loss of
influence in applied research, however, was compensated with
increased authority over all basic research in Academy and
non-Academy institutes, higher educational institutes, and
the ministries [Ref. 19: p. 29]. This return to a greater
emphasis on basic research by the Academy, however, did not
imply greater freedom from the Party.
While the boundaries of intellectual freedom to pursue
research have been extended in the post-Stalin period,
science has not been freed from political influence.
Soviet authorities still make demands upon the scien-
tists, although frequently different ones than they made
in the past. Controls over scientists have not really
been relaxed, but the goals of such controls have been
redefined in accord with changing official perceptions
of national needs. Today it is the problems of a more
sophisticated society and industrial order that Soviet
scientists and engineers are under pressure to address
and solve. [Ref. 17: p. 4]
The academies control institutes, laboratories,
experimental stations, observatories, libraries, and museums
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[Ref. 18: p. 36]. Of these, the research institute is the
primary performer. Institutes vary in size from forty to
several thousand scientists and engineers, as well as in
their degree of specialization [Ref. 17: p. 65]. A typical
organization of an Academy research institute is shown in
Figure 10 [ Ref. 17: p. 66]. The research director exer-
cises considerable control over the institute. Directors
are elected by secret ballot by the Academy's General
Assembly. They are formally elected for four year terms but
in practice may serve indefinitely. The director's power
lies in his authority over the organization of research
work, selection of projects and personnel, and distribution
of block grants and contractual finances [Ref. 19: p. 34].
The director also may modify those aspects of construction
projects not specified in the annual plan [Ref. 18: p. 36]
.
The Academic Council (or Learned Council) assists
the director. It is composed of the director, deputy
directors of scientific affairs, the scientific secretary,
the heads of departments and sections of the institute,
Party representatives, trade union representatives, and
eminent scientists. The Council advises the director on
matters of planning and organization as well as on science
policy [Ref. 19: p. 34]
.
2. The Industrial Branch Ministries
The second category of research performer is the
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ministries in the Soviet Union. The first, all-union
ministries, are responsible for priority national functions
which transcend republic jurisdiction; these ministries
directly administer subordinate activities. The second,
union-republic ministries, generally coordinate intra-
republic functions through each republic's counterpart
ministry. The third, republic ministries, are subordinate
only to their appropriate republic Councils of [Ministers
[Ref. 17: p. 29]. Figure 11 shows the all-union and union-
republic industrial ministries [Ref. 19: p. 46].
Industrial ministries control two kinds of research
and development organizations—the branch institute and the
industrial enterprise. The branch institute is similar to
the academy research institute. Figure 12 [Ref. 19: p. 50]
shows the organization of a typical branch institute. As in
the academy institute, the director is a powerful figure.
Appointed by the minister, the director organizes the
institute's work, formulates project and personnel
training plans, arranges financial and technical
procurement, oversees publication work, and establishes
and changes pay scales. [Ref. 19: p. 47]
Unlike the academy institutes, branch institute directors
are generally not scientists and are often less qualified to
manage research activities [Ref. 17: p. 179; and Ref. 19:
p. 47] .
The second major kind of research organization is
the industrial enterprise. The enterprise is primarily
35
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concerned with production but may have its own research -and
development facilities. However, "... for the most pare
enterprises only adopt and expand technology originating
elsewhere and supply technical support to the production
unit" [Ref. 19: p. 45]. To improve the incorporation of new
technology into production processes, the USSR Council of
Ministers in 1973 decreed that enterprises and branch
institutes be merged into associations. Associations, in
which research is secondary to production, are production
associations (PO) while those in which research is primary
are scientific production associations (NPO) . This
restructuring is still being implemented [Ref. 17: p. 59;
and Ref. 19: pp. 50-1]
.
Industrial research and development receives the
major share of national science finance and manpower
allocations. The branch institutes employ approximately
fifty-eight percent of the scientific workers and receive
eighty percent of the total science expenditures. Of these
funds, twenty to twenty-five percent are received from State
Budget grants while seventy-five to eighty percent are from
ministerial or contractual sources. The enterprises employ
three percent of the scientific workers and receive two
percent of the science funds. Fifteen percent of these
funds are from State Budget grants and the remainder from
contracts and ministerial sources [Ref. 17: pp. 46 and 95].
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Overall, civilian ministries control 3,620 research




The third major category of research performer in
the Soviet Union is the higher educational institute.
Higher educational institutes control 859 research
institutions [Ref. 19: p. 11] . The Ministry of Higher and
Specialized Education (MinVUZ) administers research
conducted in universities and in non-university higher
educational institutes (VUZy) such as specialized schools
and polytechnic institutions. Only one- third of the VUZy
are directly subordinate to MinVUZ, however, with the
remainder subordinate to various specialized ministries.
This relationship is shown in Figure 13 [Ref. 19: p. 57].
Those directly subordinate to MinVUZ conduct ninety percent
of total VUZy research while VUZy controlled by the
Ministries of Agriculture and Health conduct ten percent
[Ref. 19: p. 55]. The research institutes associated with
the Soviet Union's 65 universities concentrate on funda-
mental research. Those associated with the more specialized
VUZy are primarily concerned with applied research [Ref. 19:
pp. 53-4]
.
Unlike the United States, research and education are
not closely associated. After the Revolution, the Soviet
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functions. In the mid-1950s, however, the Party decided to
reincorporate research into the educational system.
Research participation by educational facilities is
still increasing, with an estimated sixty percent of the
VUZy daytime students currently assisting in research
activities [Ref. 17: p. 60]. The USSR Academy also assumed
an increasing association with higher educational insti-
tutes. The Academy not only plans basic research conducted
at the universities and VUZy, but Academy scientists lecture
and write textbooks for educational institutes. In addi-
tion, Academy research facilities may be made available to
VUZy researchers and students [Ref. 19: p. 56]. The
University of Novosibirsk, created in 1959, is a unique
fusion of Academy and MinVUZ efforts to train scientists.
The Academy selects the best students from the country to
participate in this strongly research oriented institution.
The professors are all researchers attached to the USSR
Academy's Siberian Department and the students, by their
third year, are also conducting research in an Academy
institute. This university represents the highest
integration of education and research [Ref. 18: p. 54; and
Ref. 19: pp. 41-2] .
The organization of a more typical VUZy research
facility is shown in Figure 14 [Ref. 19: p. 58]. The rector
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research plan while the prorector administers research
activities [Ref. 19: p. 58]. Overall, higher educational
institutes employ twenty-eight percent of the nation's
scientific workers and receive nine percent of the science
expenditures. Eighty percent of these funds are from
contract sources and twenty percent from State Budget grants
[Ref. 17: p. 46; and Ref. 19: p. 70] .
E. MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Military related research efforts are assumed to
dominate Soviet science and technology, though the extent is
unknown. Unspecified military research expenditures are
subsumed in the overall national science budget; however,
estimates range from forty to eighty percent of research and
development resources being devoted to military requirements
[Ref. 18: p. 189; and Ref. 19: p. 22]. The nature of the
interaction between the military and research and
development communities is, therefore, an important element
in the structure of Soviet science.
Military research policy is determined by the Party's
Politburo. Structurally, the organizations involved in
military research and development parallel and interface
with the civilian organizations previously discussed. The
Defense Council, a subcommittee within the Politburo advised
by top military officials, "... probably reviews and makes





defense budget, major weapons programs, and major shifts in
ilitary doctrine, which ... would be likely to come before
the full Politburo for final decision" [Ref. 21: p. 46].
The Party Secretariat has four departments involved in
ilitary policy determination— the Departments of Defense
Industry, Machine Construction, Administrative Organs, and
the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and
Navy (MPA)
. Three of these departments are associated with
ilitary research. Members of the MPA serve at military
research institutes to administer political education and
monitor morale. The Departments of Defense Industry and
Machine Construction jointly supervise those governmental
ministries primarily associated with defense industry
[Ref. 21: pp. 48-9]
.
In the Soviet government, the Military-Industrial
Commission (VPK) , subordinate to the USSR Council of
Ministers, is the highest organization coordinating military
research and development.
The chairman of the VPK, who is a member of the Council
Presidium, integrates military production with R&D
policies, establishes priorities and monitors their
implementation, and coordinates military production with
economic planning. [Ref. 19: p. 20]
In cooperation with Gosplan, VPK balances the requirements
of the Ministry of Defense with the production capacities of
the various defense related industrial ministries for inclu-
sion in the annual and five-year plans [Ref. 21: p. 176].
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While apparently not involved in this formulation of defense
production inputs to national plans, David Holloway
speculates that the GKNT alerts the military to civilian
research with potential defense application [Ref. 13: pp.
208-9]. The GKNT also provides the military with foreign
technology information through the services of VINITI
[Ref. 19: p. 22].
There are eight ministries primarily engaged in defense
production. These ministries— Defense Industry, Aviation
Industry, Shipbuilding Industry, Electronics Industry,
General Machine Building, Medium Machine Building, and
Machine Build ing--and their defense products, are listed in
Table VI [Ref. 21: p. 21]. These are not the only indus-
tries involved in military production nor do they produce
armaments exclusively. Other ministries involved in
military production, to a lesser extent, are those of
Instrument Manufacture, Tractor and Agriculture Machinery
Building, Chemical Industry, and Automobile Industry. The
military services maintain close liaison with the defense
industrial ministries through their weapons development
directorate representatives. These military officers
represent defense interests at ministry design bureaus and
production plants. They are empowered to enforce precise
technical specifications in research, product development,






















vehicles, small arms, fuses,
primers, propellants, explosives,
and possibly tactical guided
missiles
Aircraft, aircraft parts, and
probably aerodynamic missiles
Naval vessels of all types





equipment, radar, and computers
Strategic ballistic missile
and space vehicles
Nuclear devices and warheads
Possibly some portion of
ballistic missiles and space
vehicles
Source: The Military in Contemporary Soviet Policies
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p. 22; and Ref. 21: pp. 176, 131-2, and 186]. Quality
standards for military items are higher than for civilian
products [Ref. 18: p. 21].
The research institutes of defense industry ministries
perform approximately ninety percent of military related
applied research [Ref. 19: p. 21]. For basic research of
potential military value, the military relies on the
research efforts of the academies and higher educational
institutes as well as on "invisible institutes"— secret
military facilities not officially listed, which conduct
both basic and applied research. The academies conduct some
basic research for the military on a contractual basis [Ref.
19: p. 20]. In addition, however, the USSR Academy was
charged in 1963 with responsibility to advise the military
of potential technological applications of fundamental
research [Ref. 18: p. 201]. The Academy's importance to
defense has increased as military technology has become more
sensitive to basic research developments.
Before the Second World War it was, as a rule, the
applied and technical sciences that influenced the
development of weapons; but now basic research is coming
to have a direct and immediate impact.... All scien-
tific research is relevant to defense: "now it is
impossible to name with firm conviction any branch of
natural science which would be neutral or unnecessary
for the development of military affairs. Any branch of
natural sciences either already takes part, or can






Military industrial processes differ from civilian
production in several aspects. Military production
management is more highly structured, and utilizes
sophisticated systems planning and management techniques
similar to those used in American aerospace and defense
industries. This program planning and financing often
ploys zero-based budgeting and a programmed-goals
pproach. Such a system facilitates the introduction of new
ideas and projects and the termination of unproductive
projects. This contrasts with the institutional inertia
associated with block funding in the civilian sector [Ref.
17: pp. 97 and 321]. Another difference lies in the
qualification of the institute directors to manage research
and development. Unlike the civilian sector, where
directors are often unqualified,
in the defense-related sectors, such as the machine-tool
and instrument making, radio, and electrical equipment
industries, R&D management is qualified, experienced,
and forceful. [Ref. 17: p. 179].
Military research also enjoys greater latitude in
pursuing parallel lines of research. The Soviet philosophy
views duplication and competition as wasting resources and
inherent deficiencies of capitalism. Central planning is
intended to eliminate this waste. Competition and
duplication are tolerated to a greater degree in the
military, however, due to the complexities and uncertainties
of military technology and in light of the urgent military
competition with the United States [Ref. 17: pp. 5 and 134].
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Another aspect of the military sector is the greater
restriction on communication among scientists.
Pervasive secrecy does not generally permit access to
Western scientists or the publication of research
results in open literature. In addition, compart-
mentali zation , conservatism, and a propensity for
avoiding personal risks seem to be characteristic of
military research in the U.S.S.R. [Ref. 19: p. 22]
Secrecy in the military sector has the additional effect of
attracting lower quality personnel. "The secrecy which
prevails in the defense sector makes it easier to gain
higher degrees, and so qualifications are not necessarily a
good indication of quality" [Ref. 18: p. 198]. Offsetting
these restrictions on communication is the greater access
which military research facilities have to foreign technical
publications and VINITI services.
The secrecy associated with military research results in
a one-way flow of information from the civilian sector.
While the Academy and GKNT are responsible for tracking
civilian research for potential military application, there
is no reciprocation from the military sector.
Nor has there been any substantial spin-off from these
national security and high technology related projects
in terms of civilian applications to national needs and
improvements in the quality of life. [Ref. 17: p. 12]
In addition, military research receives priority in terms of
financial, material, and human resources. Military research
institutes offer higher wages and benefits to scientists and
engineers. These institutes can also acquire laboratory
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equipment in critical supply [Ref. 17: p. 103; and Ref. 19:
p. 22]. In spite of this traditional emphasis on military
needs, there is an increasing awareness among Soviet leaders
of the importance of a strong civilian economy, and of the
military interdependence with civilian basic research.
Primary preoccupation with questions of national
security, which underlay the science policy efforts of
both (the United States and the Soviet Union) in the
1950s and 1960s, has given way, more or less, to greater
concern with applying science and technology to solve
domestic civil sector problems. [Ref. 17: p. 300]
The deeply rooted Russian interest in military over civilian
technology, dating from the tsarist reign of Peter the Great
will, however, ensure the continued predominance of the
military in Soviet science and technology for the
foreseeable future [Ref. 17: p. 12].
F. SUMMARY
This chapter has briefly reviewed the structure of
Soviet science. Structure significantly affects the Soviet
ability both to pursue basic research and to incorporate
technical innovations into production cycles. The
structural barriers to technical application are examined in
Paul Cocks' analysis of Soviet science, Science Policy:
USA/USSR, Volume II: Science Policy in the Soviet Union
[Ref. 17]. The cultural characteristics influencing this
structure and their subsequent impact on Soviet basic
research will be addressed in the following chapter.
100

V. RUSSIAN CULTURE AND SOVIET SCIENCE
A. THE PREDOMINANCE OF RUSSIAN CULTURE IN THE SOVIET UNION
Georgraphically , the Soviet Union spans the Eurasian
landmass, touching nations of Europe, Central Asia, and
Asia. This expanse is reflected in the range of nation-
alities governed by the fifteen republics of the Soviet
Union. Within more than one hundred nationalities are
twenty-three major ethnic groups, including the fifteen
nationalities for whom the republics are named, the Tatars,
Germans, Jews, Chuvash, Peoples of Dagistan, Bashkirs,
Mordvins, and Poles [Ref. 22: p. 264]. These groups vary
widely in religious and cultural backgrounds. Religious
traditions include Russian Orthodox, Moslem, Catholic,
Christian, and Jewish faiths, while diverse cultures-
European, Caucasian, Central Asian, and Asian--range along
the Soviet borders. Predominant among these many groups,
however, are the Russian people.
Russian dominance is felt in most facets of the Soviet
system including science. This dominance is maintained
through a variety of mechanisms. The Russians are still the
largest national group by population (over fifty-two percent
in 1979), although this lead is slipping as other groups,
particularly Muslim Asians and Caucasians, sustain higher
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birthrates [Ref. 22: p. 265]. In addition to this numerical
superiority, Russians enjoy a disproportionate influence in
the Party and government. In 1981, Russians accounted for
sixty percent of the Party membership and sixty-five percent
of the full and candidate Politburo members and Central
Committee Secretaries [Ref. 22: p. 270]. The universal use
of Russian as a primary or secondary language is another
mechanism for exerting Russian influence.
... The pressure to learn Russian, and even to use it in
preference to one's native language, is considerable.
Many governmental, economic, and Party activities are
conducted almost exclusively in Russian, even in the
non-Russian republics. The same is true of the Soviet
armed forces, much of higher education, and other
aspects of life. The message, although nowhere spelled
out in so many words, is clear: If you want to get
anywhere in life, learn Russian. [Ref. 22: pp. 268-9]
An additional mechanism is the migration of Russians to non-
Russian republics [Ref. 22: pp. 265-6].
Unfavorable economic and social conditions, particularly
in the rural areas of their own ethnic territory,
provided the impetus for the out-migration of millions
of Russians to other parts of the country, including the
non-Russian lands, where their numbers rose from 6.2
million in 1926 to 23.9 million in 1979. The vast
majority of these Russian migrants settled in urban
areas and in many instances took the better jobs,
thereby foreclosing opportunities for upward mobility by
the local inhabitants. Once a Russian presence is
established it takes on an inertial character, since a
large Russian population in a non-Russian area provides
the linguistic and cultural atmosphere attractive to
other Russian migrants. [Ref. 20: pp. 288-9]
Soviet science serves to illustrate other mechanisms
supporting Russian dominance. Three aspects of organiza-
tional structure enhance Russian influence. First, the
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academies and ministries of the fifteen republics are
subordinate to both their republic Council of Ministers and
their Russian dominated USSR counterparts. Thus, "... given
the highly centralized Soviet system and its distinct set of
R&D priorities ... republic and local involvement in science
planning and management remains substantially circumscribed"
[Ref. 17: p. 299]. Second, the republic organizations
replicate the national structures based on Russian culture,
thus transmitting the Russian heritage to the non-Russian
republics. "A 'historical tradition 1 must be transmitted,
and one of the ways that is done is through patterns of
organization, education, communication, and reward..."
[Ref. 23. p. 57]. The third aspect is the common practice
in the republics of placing a Russian as the organization's
second-in-command [Ref. 22: p. 270-2; and Ref. 24: p. 130].
In addition to these aspects, the greater specialization of
republic ministries and academies serves to limit their
national influence.
Another mechanism is the disporport ionate number of
Russians in the scientific community. As with the Party and
government, the concentration of Russians in science is
higher than their percentage by overall population. The
percentages of scientific workers by national or ethnic
origin in 1960 and 1961 are given in Table VII [Ref. 25: p.




Scienti fie Workers by National or Ethnic Origin,
USSR, 1960 and 1961
1960 1961
Per Per
Thousands cent Thousands cent
Russian 229.55 64.8 263.84 65.3
Ukrainian 35.43 10.0 40.95 10.1
Jewish 33.53 9.5 36.17 8.9
Georg ian 8.31 2.3 9.29 2.3
Armenian 8.00 2.3 9.12 2.3
Byelorussian 6.36 1.8 7.24 1.8
Azerbaid zhan 4.97 1.4 5.42 1.3
Uzbek 3.75 1.1 4.51 1.1
Tatar 3.69 1.0 4.31 1.1
Lithuanian 2.96 .8 3.32 .8
Latvian 2.66 .8 2.95 .7
Kazakh 2.29 .6 2.66 .7
Estonian 2.05 .6 2.30 .6
All other ethnic groups
of the USSR 7.98 2.3 12.05 3.0
Foreign Nationals 2.63 .7 2.82 .7
Total 354. 16 100.0 404.13 100.0
Source: Soviet Research and Development
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research institutes are geographically concentrated. A
majority of science establishments are located in the
Western portion of the USSR in the Russian and culturally
similar Ukrainian republics.
Moscow alone boasts one-fourth of all scientific
workers, 34 percent of all doctors of science and 26
percent of all candidates of science. Here also are the
most qualified researchers: 45 percent of all
scientists with the title of professor; 72 percent of
all full members and 64 percent of all corresponding
members of the USSR Academy. In just three cities—
Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev--are concentrated one fourth
of all scientific institutions, nearly 40 percent of all
R&D being performed in the country, and more than 45
percent of the total allocations to scientific research
and development. [Ref. 17: p. 50]
Finally, the quality of the republic science establishments
is considered inferior to those in the Western USSR.
The large number of poorly qualified scientists attracted
by the profession's prestige and material rewards, com-
bined with party interference in scientific appointments,
constitutes a major weakness of Soviet science. With the
partial exception of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences,
the Academies of the individual Soviet republics are
mostly staffed by such people, and their productivity is
practically nil. [Ref. 20: p. 229]
As a result of these and other mechanisms, Russian
culture has been the primary influence shaping the
characteristics of Soviet science. "In spite of apparently
genuine efforts by Lenin to curb Great Russian chauvinism
within Soviet territory, the dominance of the Russian
nationality was and continues to be one of the basic facts
of life in the Soviet Union today" [Ref. 22: p. 263].
Therefore the structure of Soviet science will be considered
in light of its Russian origin.
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3. CHARACTERISTICS OF RUSSIAN CULTURE
Russian culture evolved as a unique mixture of
Byzantine, Asian, and European characteristics. The
Byzantine Empire exerted a strong influence on the state of
Kievan Rus from the ninth through the fifteenth century,
when Constantinople fell to the Turks. This influence
included a tradition of centralism and autocracy; "... the
Cyrillic alphabet ...; Orthodox Christianity; and the
concept of the God-Emperor, who combined in his person the
authority of the Pope and the Emperor" [Ref. 22: p. 14].
Early Russia was also strongly affected by two centuries of
rule by the Mongol-Tartar khans from the thirteenth century
until 1480. The Mongol rule "... reinforced the Byzantine
inclination toward centralism and autocracy..." [Ref. 22:
pp. 14-5] and accustomed the Russian people to cruel,
despotic rulers and barbarism. For several centuries, then,
Russian culture was largely insulated from European
influences
.
Long isolated from Western Europe, Russia grew up
without participating in developments that many
Russians, taking pride in their unique culture, find of
dubious value. Russia was never a part of the Roman
Empire. She never recognized the temporal or spiritual
authority of the Roman pope. The Renaissance and the
Reformation both passed her by; the scientific
revolution was in Russia only a feeble reverberation of
the explosion in the West. Her political and social
revolution came so late that it seemed strange and
frightening to more "sophisticated" nations who had
experienced similar upheavals in earlier centuries.
Russia is, as a result, the most unusual member of the
European family— if indeed she is European at all; the
question is still open to debate, particularly among the
Russians themselves. [Ref. 26: p. 12]
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European influence was to wait until the reign of Peter the
Great in the eighteenth century. "By the end of his life,
Peter had forcibly Europeanized Russian, dragging her
reluctantly into the 'modern 1 world" [Ref. 26: pp. 12-3].
This modernization process included an infusion of Western
scientific thought and technology—a sporadic but recurring
theme in subsequent Russian history.
No spontaneous movement to develop science grew in
Russia. Instead scientific centers had to be developed
by the central government based on Western models.
[Ref. 19: p. 28]
Peter the Great's efforts to incorporate Western science
culminated in 1724 in the founding of the Russian Academy
—
the first scientific organization in Russia, later renamed
the USSR Academy of Sciences— establishing a Russian
tradition of state-directed science.
The significance of the Russian isolation from European
thought and their belated importation of Western science is
highlighted by Kuhn's observation that
... only the civilizations that descend from Hellenic
Greece have possessed more than the most rudimentary
science. The bulk of scientific knowledge is a product
of Europe in the last four centuries. No other place
and time has supported the very special communities from
which scientific productivity comes. [Ref. 10: p. 168]
This suggests that the non-European attributes dominant in
Russian culture prior to the eighteenth century caused the
initial reliance on Western science and technology. This
Russian character, already largely formed by the time of
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Peter the Great, strongly influenced the subsequent develop-
ment of science in Russia and the Soviet Union, as well.
In terms of the cultural characteristics discussed in
Chapter III, Russian culture is high context and has a low
tolerance for uncertainty. Harsh historical and environ-
mental conditions generated a national angst toward
instability and chaos, and caused the evolution of social
structures emphasizing group survival to minimize uncer-
tainty. Chaos is a function of factors both external to the
group and internal to the individual members. Both the
external and internal factors encouraging chaos must be
controlled by group authority.
Whether under czars or commissars, Russians have
traditionally had a deeply ingrained fear of anarchy
and the centrifugal forces that tug at the unity and
stability of their vast state.... Centralized
despotism with the czar or Party Leader projected as the
personification of the state has been Russia's historic
answer to the chaos it feared.... Russians prize order
and security as much as Americans prize freedom. Most
Russians ... are so genuinely dismayed at the unemploy-
ment, crime, political assasinations , drugs, and labor
strife in American life that they prefer instead the
disadvantages of censorship, police controls, arbitrary
arrests, labor camps and enforced intellectual conform-
ity... It is not only the chaos around them but the
anarchy within themselves that Russians seem to fear....
Theirs is an imposed discipline, not an ethnic instinct
for regimentation. [Ref. 7: pp. 333-5]
Control of chaos is achieved by establishing supremacy
of the group over the individual and relying on incremen-
talism to prevent instability. The resulting Russian
characteristics are consistent with the attributes of a high
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context culture and uncertainty avoidance societal norms and
connotations (Tables III and IV) . The importance of the
group in Russian culture is illustrated in a statement by
the Soviet biologist, V. W. Inyushin:
"A personality ... cannot have any independent,
intrinsic value, because every individual is, first and
foremost, part of a whole, namely of society. Society's
chief need is progress.... (The) effect of progress
should be to produce a harmonized society, one in which
each person's aspirations combine with others' for the
good of the community, like the various cells of a
body.... We must harmonize society on a scientific
basis, and for that purpose people must forego their
private tastes and ambitions for the sake of general
progress." [Ref. 24: p. 191]
The intense group-orientation of Russian culture provides
the basis for a high context system. "In cultures in which
people are deeply involved with each other ... —what (are
termed) high context cultures— simple messages with deep
meaning flow freely" [Ref. 15: p. 39]. This style of
interaction requires the inculcation of a strong shared
image as a basis for consensus and a standard for
conformity. In addition, this shared image serves as a
framework enabling utilization and reliance on pattern
recognition as an integral element of group interaction. As
a high context, low tolerance culture, Russian character-
istics include suppression of internal conflict and
individualism; a need for consensus and conformity;
intolerance toward new ideas, risk, and change; xenophobia;
gerontocratic rule to restrain youthful inexperience and
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impulsiveness; organizational inertia; central, hierarchical
control structures; secrecy; committee rule projecting a
unanimous front; incremental ism; and conservatism. As
cultural extensions, Soviet science and science education
reflect and reinforce these Russian characteristics.
C. STRUCTURE AND CULTURE
Soviet science is structured to enable Party and
governmental control. Control is critical to the Soviet
system to prevent instability and this consideration
outweighs any potential benefit to be gained from greater
scientific freedom. [Ref. 24: p. 49; and Ref. 18: p. 63]
The Soviet government, like its Tsarist predecessor, has
been ambivalent toward science. On the one hand, it
sees science as indispensable for economic modernization
and for enhancing Soviet military power; on the other
hand, the regime distrusts the scientific spirit with
its critical attitude towards authority and individual-
istic approach to problem-solving. The evolution of
science as an autonomous social activity carries the
dangers of professional exclusiveness , elitism, and the
assertion of rationalistic modes of thought. Manifes-
tations of dissent in recent years among scientists
testify to the reality of these dangers and make
ideological problems a continuing basic concern of
Soviet science policy. [Ref. 17: p. 3]
The requisite control of science is achieved through
positive and negative organizational mechanisms, and through
indoctrination and constraint of the individual.
Positive organizational mechanisms actively transmit
control downward from the top Party and governmental organs.
This control is maintained through the hierarchical
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structure subordinating the ministries, educational system,
and academies to the USSR Council of Ministers and the
Politburo. The power projected through the national annual
budget and five-year and long range plans enables the
Council and Politburo to determine science policy and
actively participate in translating policy into directives
and resource allocations. This control is reinforced by the
overview and enforcement of plan directives by the Party
organization paralleling the hierarchy of science
structures. Centralized control is also enhanced by the
increasing concentration of scientific research in large
institutes employing thousands of scientific workers and in
research complexes where several institutes are colocated
[Ref. 17: pp. 183-4 and 274], This trend toward concen-
tration of research and development efforts reduces
administrative fragmentation and facilitates centralized
control. Concentration has the additional advantage of
reducing duplicate research efforts.
Negative organizational control mechanisms serve to
dampen tendencies toward conflict and radical change. By
discouraging these tendencies, negative mechanisms stabilize
and moderate the system. One mechanism fostering incremen-
talism is rule by committee throughout the hierarchy of
science organizations. Authority in Soviet organizations
typically is concentrated in subcommittees within larger
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committee structures. These subcommittees are headed by a
chairman or secretary who functions as the primus inter
pares. Decision making is a group process—emphasizing
consensus, confining pre-consensus debate internally, and
culminating in unanimous pronouncements. The consensus
building process must balance conflicting viewpoints and
needs of the committee members. This encourages incremental
policy making. Committee rule is employed at all levels
—
the Politburo, Council of Ministers, state committees,
ministries, and academies. At the level of the research
institute, power is concentrated in the hands of the
director; however, the Academic, or Learned, Council
participates in the decision making process.
... (The) dominant impression from Soviet publications
and from interviews is that the division of power
between the director and the learned council produces
collegial decision making by unanimity, and therefore a
tendency toward conservatism and inertia in the
selection of projects. [Ref. 23: p. 39]
A second dampening mechanism is gerontocratic rule. In
science, gerontocracy is maintained both in the higher
average age of the established scientist and, more impor-
tantly, in the greater authority commanded by older
scientists
.
... (The) Soviet scientific elite is considerably older
than its American counterpart. In 1970, 58.5 percent of
Soviet academicians where over sixty, compared to 50.6
percent of American members of the National Academy of
Sciences. But that statistic understates the differ-
ence, for Soviet academicians have vastly more power
over research resources than do the American members of
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the NAS. A more relevant comparison, in terms of
influence over resources and research directions, might
be the average age of (American National Science
Foundation) advisors (forty-seven years in 1 9 7 "i . [Ref.
23: p. 45-6]
The Soviet practice of employing scientists as adminis-
trators in academy, higher educational, and military
research institutes reinforces the preponderance of age.
The power of resource allocation, bolstered by the policy of
block funding to institutes, lies with the administrator.
For the Soviet scientist to pursue research projects of
personal interest, he must assume administrative duties.
Under a block-funding system, formal rank gives power
over resources and research directions, while under
project-grant system it gives very little. Therefore,
the best American scientists have no incentive to hold
administrative positions, but for the best Soviet
researchers it is an important part of scientific
success. [Ref. 23: p. 36]
Advancement in the Soviet system, however, is a gradual
process requiring the completion of advanced degrees and the
cultivation of influential contacts. Thus, "... a Soviet
researcher is relatively old by the time he reaches a
position of sufficient power to control resources and impose
his ideas" [Ref. 23: p. 36]. One result of this system is
that senior scientists reserve the prerogative to conduct
basic research and assign the applied research projects to
junior scientists [Ref. 23: p. 47]. Another result is the




The planning and budgetary process is another mechanism
moderating change. The build on approach— "improving and
scaling up existing processes rather than ... developing
basically new processes" [Ref. 17: p. 127] — is character-
istic of Soviet planning and is encouraged by the budgetary
process .
... (The) State Budget in the Soviet Union is an annual
budget. There is no five-year budget that can be linked
to the five-year macroeconomic plan. Funds--as the
basis for obtaining material and technical resources
—
are distributed only for one-year periods. Such a short
time horizon prevents the development of a genuine
investment toward R&D outlays that is oriented to long-
term returns. On the contrary, it reinforces the
dominant tendency to plan "from the achieved level"
and to focus on inputs rather than results. [Ref. 17:
p. 102].
Thus the budget and national plans support incremental
changes to the status quo
.
The rigidity of Soviet organizational hierarchy further
constrains the potential for unanticipated change. This
rigidity discourages interaction between research
institutes. "(The) structure of decision making is
predominantly vertical and thus substantially inhibits
lateral communication/ cooperation, and coordination" [Ref.
17: p. 17]. Communication of new ideas is additionally
circumscribed by secrecy, censorship, and limited access to
foreign scientists and publications.
In addition to positive and negative organizational
mechanisms, social control is accomplished through
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indoctrination and constraint of the individual. Social
indoctrination occurs throughout the life of the individual,
inculcating rhose traits conducive to maintaining the
controlling social order. In the Soviet Union, social
indoctrination reinforces Russian characteristics stressing
conformity, subordination, and collectivity [Ref. 22: pp.
46-74]. In science, the emphasis on conformity serves to
repress exceptional research abilities and independent
ideas. Such abilities and ideas threaten to disrupt the
predictability of the system and may attract critical
attention. "(A) researcher learns from his earliest years
to conceal his views, feelings, and abilities. Any kind of
brilliance is especially dangerous, as it may arouse
suspicion or hostility on the part of his superiors" [Ref.
24: p. 51]. Because of the considerable power which the
superior exercises over an individual's career and research
opportunities, subordination outweighs individual prefer-
ences. Hedrick Smith noted this tendency in a discussion
with a Soviet scientist.
"A man with his own ideas is in difficulty because the
essence of the game is to understand the desires of
superiors, or better yet, to anticipate their desires.
It is bad to get the reputation of being difficult to
work with or being too knowledgeable." [Ref. 7: p. 391]
This acceptance of authority buttresses gerontocracy in
research institutes. "(Leading) Soviet scientists ... find
it entirely appropriate that a laboratory or even an entire
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institute embody the ideas of a single leader, and that
younger researchers in the laboratory remain that leader's
pupils for a substantial part of their professional lives"
[Ref . 23: p. 47]
.
The precedence of the group is another value instilled
by indoctrination. Receiving collective approval and
contributing to the group are paramount goals for the
individual. Sociological surveys of technical specialists
and researchers working in Voronezh in 1974 indicate that
collective approval is valued more highly than the
opportunity to pursue creative work [Ref. 23: pp. 160-1].
In addition, conflict within the group is considered to be
disruptive to both the collective good and scientific
research .
The late Academician A. V. Nikolaev once stated a
belief that most Soviet researchers would probably
share: "Fights and arguments are counterproductive in a
scientific community," especially public controversy.
[Ref. 23: p. 59]
The suppression of conflict and the subordination of
creativity to the collective good are additional factors
preventing radical change.
In addition to deeply ingrained social values which
discourage individualism, the individual's environment is
controlled by limiting exposure to new ideas. Potentially
disruptive foreign influences are of special concern to the
Soviet system. These influences are limited both by
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controlling travel by Soviet scientists abroad and travel by
foreigners in the Soviet Union, and by restricting access to
foreign publications.
Rigidity ... restricts Soviet scientists' contacts with
the outside world. It is still a major accomplishment
for a Russian scientist to get to an international
meeting, let alone make a prolonged visit to a
laboratory in another country. [Ref. 8: p. 328]
It is not only exposure to foreign ideas that is controlled,
however. Secrecy is one means of limiting the dissemination
of new ideas. In addition, a lack of mobility of scientists
between research institutes prevents parochial and stable
viewpoints from becoming unsettled by fresh ideas. The
transfer of personnel is limited both by the system and by
individual preference [Ref. 17: p. 267]. Transfer can be
denied the individual; but, in addition, the importance of
gaining administrative positions provides a strong incentive
to remain in an organization. "Soviet researchers have
every interest in staying in one place, cultivating their
relations with colleagues and superiors, and gradually
rising to positions of influence" [Ref. 23: p. 36]. As a
result, transfers between institutes are infrequent, as are
transfers between fields and specialties [Ref. 7: p. 254;
and Ref. 17: p. 267]. These limitations in mobility and
access to foreign ideas contribute to the circumscription of





Structural and social mechanisms, then, enable the
central control and preserve the system stability which ara
fundamentally important in Russian culture.
(The) differences in (Russian and American science)
organization and management ... stem from profoundly
different national attitudes toward authority,
uncertainty, and conflict.... The United States has a
political and national culture with a high tolerance for
risk and uncertainty, individual initiative, open
conflict, administrative informality and fluidity,
disrespect for established beliefs and persons, and high
mobility. The system as a whole appears to show a zest
for the unplanned opportunity. The Soviet system
appears to choose, wherever it can, the greater
predictability. [Ref. 23: pp. 57-8]
D. SCIENCE EDUCATION AND CULTURE
Science education lays the foundation for the predic-
table and stable system of Soviet research. Education
serves as both an indoctrination and control mechanism. As
an indoctrination mechanism, education is an integral com-
ponent of the socialization process instilling the collec-
tivist values of Russian culture. Collective responsibility
is taught throughout the course of Soviet education. In his
observations of the education system and discussions with
former Soviet journalist, Leonid Vladimirov, Hedrick Smith
notes that
... youngsters are instilled with a conformist,
collectivist zeal. "The greatest offense a child can
commit in kindergarten is to be different." observed
Vladimirov. [Ref. 7: p. 212]
This indoctrination continues through the individual's life
both through further education and group pressure.
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Education at the secondary school and higher educational
institute levels emphasizes a traditional style of science
training. Classes are highly structured and students are
rigorously taught the body of accepted scientific theory.
Students have practically no freedom of choice in their
programs, and must attend many strictly required
lectures. Little attention is paid to developing
creative skills.... (At) Soviet universities great
emphasis is placed on mechanically stuffing the memory.
[Ref. 20: pp. 229-30]
The implication of rote-learning fixed mater ial-- the
method utilized at both the secondary and higher educational
levels [Ref. 7: p. 221; and Ref. 22: p. 43] — is twofold.
Smith notes that
... the cost of the stifling conservatism of the Soviet
method is in the lost spontaneity of students and in
the Soviet system's failure to teach them to think
creatively for themselves or to ask imaginative, probing
questions. [Ref. 7: p. 223]
On the other hand,
... the positive side of the no-nonsense Soviet approach
to classroom education is that great gobs of materials
are committed to memory and children are drilled to
mastery of fundamentals. In subjects like math and the
natural sciences which lend themselves to that method
in the early years, results are impressive. [Ref. 7:
p. 222]
This style of science education inculcates the student with
the shared image of the scientific community and reinforces
the use of paradigms and pattern recognition in problem
solving
.
Science education as a control mechanism limits access
to the scientific community. The uneven quality of
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education throughout ' the Soviet Union is accounted for at
the higher educational level with intensely competitive
entrance examinations [Ref. 7: pp. 207-8; and Ref. 20: p.
235]. Thus, although "... Soviet leaders have sought to use
the schools as mechanisms of social mobility for politically
'correct' social groups, mainly workers and peasants ..."
[Ref. 20: p. 234] , the system may actually be exacerbating
class order .
(In) spite of a nationally standardized core curriculum
set in Moscow, variations in the quality of Soviet
education are so great that both Soviet and Western
scholars now suspect that the educational system is
rigidifying and reinforcing the class structure of
Soviet society. [Ref. 7: pp. 207-8]
For science, "... the data of Soviet survey research
suggests that the children of the intelligentsia and other
white collar workers have a much better chance of getting
into engineering and other technical specialties than the
children of workers and peasants" [Ref. 23: p. 144], This
additionally tends to reinforce Russian predominance in
science .
The selection process also enables control by the Party
over the access of science to persons with politically
desirable traits [Ref. 24: pp. 44-6]. Access to basic
research is of particular concern due to the greater contact
of the researcher with new ideas and the disruptive poten-
tial of independent thinking. Exposure to the unpredictable





The Soviet system ... limits access to basic science to
a chosen few, who are picked at an early age. A crucial
selection point is admission to a top-ranking under-
graduate program. Only a handful of the very best
universities offer a broad theoretical education in the
sciences; the rest provide narrowly focused applied
programs that do not prepare the students for basic
research. But competition for the best schools is
stiff. Consequently, despite the fact that many more
Soviet students study science than American students do,
few study basic science. [Ref. 23: p. 43]
Thus, "... uncertainty is reduced by careful control over
access to the basic-research system" [Ref. 23: p. 58].
Science education in the Soviet Union, then, generates a
strong shared image emphasizing paradigms and pattern
recognition. This adherence to accepted scientific theory
is reinforced with the indoctrination of collectivist
values. In addition, exposure to the new ideas and
independent style of thinking associated with basic research
is limited to a reliable, controllable elite. Science
education, therefore, contributes to the control and
stability of Soviet science.
E. SUMMARY
Russian culture significantly affects the structure and
characteristics of Soviet science. The deeply ingrained
Russian fear of chaos and instability translates into
structural mechanisms which permit central control of
science and encourage incremental ism . The scientific
community is strongly indoctrinated in accepted theory and
in collectivist values which perpetuate existing patterns of
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thought. Russian culture, then, acts to stabilize the
process of science. The implications of this stability on
the Soviet ability to conduct scientific research will be
discussed in the concluding chapter.
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VI . IDEOLOGY AND SOVIET SCIENCE
A. THE INTEGRATION OF IDEOLOGY AND SCIENCE
Science is integral to Soviet ideology in two respects.
First, the Soviet regime asserts the scientific validity of
Marxism-Leninism to legitimize the ideological basis of
Party rule. The view of science as objective and authori-
tative lends prestige to Soviet ideology as "... dialectic
materialism is a scientific outlook derived from science
itself" [Ref. 27: p. 153]. This linkage was established at
the outset when compatibility with contemporary scientific
theories was argued by Marx, Engels, and Lenin to gain
popular support for their theories. However,
(neither) Engels nor Lenin had any significant amount of
training in any of the sciences, and even if they had
had such training, their scientific views would now be
hopelessly dated by the rapid progress of science in the
last five decades. [Ref. 27: p. 190]
The rigid nature of Soviet ideology, however, has ossified
Marx's, Engels' , and Lenin's applications of popularized
science into Party doctrine.
That the out-dated views of certain Marxists of the last
century should continue to be regarded as fundamental
scientific truths is symptomatic of the unfortunate and
unthinking dogmatism which characterises (sic) much of
dialectic materialist philosophy. [Ref. 27: p. 190]
This enshrinement of Marx's, Engels', and Lenin's dabblings
in contemporary scientific theories and their philosophical
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implications results' in potential conflict between Soviet
doctrine and modern scientific theories. Thus, unless
carefully controlled, science may threaten rather than
validate the regime. This danger is exacerbated by the
disruptive potential of independent thinking associated with
basic research.
The initial role of science in Soviet ideology, then,
was as a legitimizing agent. Science, however, plays a
second role--as a vehicle for achieving socialism.
Kremlin leaders see their ideology as being synonymous
with science, and they have long regarded the latter as
an indispensable tool for modernizing Russia. The early
Bolsheviks believed that science would "conquer Russia
both as a state of mind and as a state of nature...."
Leonid Brezhnev reaffirmed this basic commitment on the
250th Anniversary of the USSR Academy of Sciences.
"Socialism and science are indivisible," he emphasized.
"Only by relying on the latest achievements of science
and technology is it possible to build socialism and
communism successfully." [Ref. 17: p. 2]
Science and technology are vital factors in determining
future military and industrial capabilities
—
capabilities
required to protect the socialist state from external
threats and achieve a means and level of production
congruent with socialist and communist objectives. The
conviction of the Soviet leadership that science is
elemental to socialist progress is reflected in the con-
centration of technological backgrounds among the Party and
governmental elites, the formal representation of the
science community at the highest policy-making level, and
the significant allocation of resources to scientific and
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technological efforts. An additional indication of the
leadership's growing awareness of the linkage between
scientific achievements and socialist goals is the inclusion
of science in the annual State plan—beginning in 1949 when
the introduction of new technology was generally addressed
and expanded in 1956 to include assignments for scientific
research [Ref. 17: p. 7]. The emphasis on science has
increased over the last three decades.
An implied feature of Soviet thought in the 1970s was
the movement towards a broader concept of science policy
and the closer integration of R&D with the totality of
domestic and foreign policy.... (Gvishiani), the deputy
chairman of the GKNT affirmed, "(R&D management and
planning) is about the future, about the long-term
development of socialist countries, about the very fate
of the world and socialism. For now only that system
can win which is able to assure itself a vanguard
position in scientific and technical progress." [Ref.
17: pp. 255-6]
The relationship of science to ideology— both as a
legitimizing agent and a vehicle for socialist goals— evokes
the highest level of Party and government interest. The
resulting interaction can influence science in two
ways— ideology may dictate the actual content of scientific
theories and ideology may determine science priorities for
resource allocations.
B. IDEOLOGY AND CONTENT
The organizational structure of Soviet science enables
the Party and government to exert considerable control over
scientific research— control potentially sufficient for the
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regime to dictate the content of scientific theories.
Despite this potential, ideological incursions into theory
content have been relatively infrequent. Several factors
contribute to this lack of interference. First is that,
with the exception of Stalin, Party leaders have not
presumed to dictate theoretical precepts.
(In) the years immediately after the Revolution almost
no one thought seriously that the Communist Party's
supervision of intellectuals would extend from the realm
of political activity to that of scientific theory
itself. Party leaders neither planned nor predicted
that the Party would approve or support certain
viewpoints internal to science; indeed, such endorsement
was fundamentally opposed by all the important leaders
of the Party.... (A) condition free of such entailment
actually obtained in the late fifties and sixties for
all the sciences except genetics, and for genetics as
well since 1965. [Ref. 28: p. 10]
This prediliction is encouraged by three additional factors.
Again, the threat of conflict between modern scientific
theories and the out-dated theories associated with Engels
and Lenin is blunted by the ambiguity of interpreting both
Marxist-Leninist and philosophical implications of modern
scientific theories. Scientists have been able to turn this
ambiguity to their advantage and, even during periods of
ideological interference, have successfully defended new
theories
.
The scientists of the immediate postwar period began
reading Marx and Engels on philosophical materialism in
order better to answer their ideological critics. They
developed arguments more incisive than those of their
Stalinist opponents; they constructed defenses that
exposed the fallacies of their official critics yet were
in accord with philosophical materialism and—most
important of all
—
preserved the cores of their sciences.




Ambiguity enables scientists to maintain the distinction
between science and the philosophy of science. Philosophy
of science then absorbs the brunt of ideological criticism
and buffers science content from Party influence.
A second factor encouraging non-interference in theory
content is the availability of alternate control mechanisms
to avert political conflict. "Bourgeois scientists" were
initially subjugated in the years following the Revolution
through political examinations and purges. Imprisonments,
executions, and dismissals from academic positions were
intended to break the spirit and assure the political
reliability of the scientific community. In addition,
positions in academies and research institutions were
increasingly filled with Party supporters.
Functionally, the purges had begun in Soviet academic
instititions as a means of personnel replacement. In
the late 1920 's, this renovative technique was used to
oust bourgeois academicians of certain institutions in
order to replace them with supporters of the Communist
Party. These replacements were frequently persons of
inferior scholarship whose enthusiasm for social
reconstruction commended them to preferment.... Even
at this time, however, no attempt was made to impose
ideological interpretations upon the work of scientists.
[Ref. 28: p. 13]
Since the revolution, the structural mechanisms discussed in
Chapter V were gradually incorporated to maintain control of
the scientific community. These mechanisms ensure the
political reliability of the scientist through indoctrina-





Other mechanisms retard the dissem-
ination and acceptance of new ideas, thereby defusing
potentially disruptive influences. The Party is thus able
to control science and scientists without imposing theory
content
.
The third factor encouraging non-intervention is the
pragmatism of the Soviet elite. While control remains the
overwhelming priority, the second priority is to maximize
scientific and technological advancement necessary to pursue
socialist goals. Scientific advancement, however, requires
a degree of independent thinking and autonomy for the
scientific community. The regime must, therefore, balance
the need for control with the need for scientific progress.
Non-interference in science content is an element of this
balance
The above factors--pred il iction , ambiguity, availability
of alternate controls, and pragmatism
—
militate against the
Party dictating theory content. Generally, these factors
have been sufficient to preserve scientific integrity. The
potential for interference remains, however, and exceptions
have occurred, particularly during the Stalin period.
No longer could it be hoped that Party organs would
distinguish between science and philosophical
interpretations of science. Evidently Stalin had no
intention of making such distinctions, and he was in
control of the Party. It soon became clear that other
scientific fields (than genetics), such as physics and
physiology, were also objects of ideological attack.
[Ref. 28: p. 19-20]
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The epitome of ideological interference occurred in
genetics with the influential rise of T. D. Lysenko
.
Lysenko espoused a genetic theory which blurred the
distinction between genotype (the genetic composition of an
organism) and phenotype (the observable characteristics of
an organism resulting from the interaction of the genotype
and the environment) and argued that environmentally
acquired characteristics could be inherited.
Lysenko ... described heredity in terms of the
relationship of an organism to its environment rather
than in the traditional sense of the transmission of
characters from ancester to descendant.... The
heredity of a living body, according to Lysenko, was
built up from the conditions of the external environment
over many generations, and each alteration of these
conditions led to a change in heredity. This process he
called the "assimilation of external conditions." Once
assimilated, these conditions became internal i zed--that
is, a part of the nature, or heredity, of the organism.
[Ref. 28: pp. 222-3]
Lysenko gained support for this theory from the political
regime by arguing its compatabil ity with Marxism-Leninism
and its greater utility to the needs of the socialist state.
Loren Graham describes four basic elements in Lysenko'
s
arguments. First, Lysenko ' misrepresented classical genetics
as claiming that genes are immutable— thus conflicting with
the precept of dialectical materialism that change is an
elemental and universal process. However, contemporary
geneticists proposed that genes do mutate and that
"biological evolution is built on the concept of great
changes resulting from minute variations occurring over vast
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periods of time" [Ref. 28: p. 232]. Lysenko's second
argument also misrepresented classical genetics. According
to Lysenko, classical genetics indicated that genes were
immune from external effects. This conflicted with Stalin's
interpretation of dialectical materialism that "'not a
single phenomenon in nature can be understood if it is
considered in isolation, disconnected from the surrounding
phenomena'" [Ref. 28: p. 234]. Classical geneticists,
however, had shown that genetic mutation could be induced by
external stimuli— radiation— in experiments conducted by H.
J. Muller in 1927. Lysenko's third argument was the greater
responsiveness of his theory to the immediate needs of the
Soviet state. The theories of classical geneticists were
unable to offer immediate control of the rate or type of
genetic mutations while Lysenko and his followers claimed
that "'it is possible, with man's intervention, to force any
form of animal or plant to change more quickly and in a
direction desirable to man'" [Ref. 28: p. 235]. This issue
of control was central to Lysenko's fourth argument as well.
Classical geneticists utilized statistical probability to
describe the occurrence of mutations over time. Lysenko
argued that the use of probability implied random action.
This conflicted with the dialectical materialist supposition
in the laws of nature and determinism [Ref. 28: pp. 230-6].
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These arguments appealed to both Stalin and Khrushchev.
Lysenko's theories were officially endorsed in 1943 after
inbred hybridization of corn crops dramatically failed to
increase crop production during the agricultural collectivi-
zation drive. Inbred hybridization required the yearly
distribution of freshly hybridized seedcorn and the
intensive use of industrially produced mineral fertilizers.
The Soviet agricultural system was unable to support these
needs and, while American crops flourished, Soviet crops
failed. Rather than question the Soviet system, however,
the regime questioned the validity of inbred hybridization.
(The) Bolshevik government was not prepared to blame
itself or its ideology for this or for any of the
agricultural fiascos that accompanied collectivization.
The formula on theory and practice was not to be turned
against Marxist-Leninist theory or its chief exponent...
The government blamed the peasants, or rather, 'kulak
agitation against corn' , and showed an ever-mounting
irritation with agricultural scientists who were using
large sums for research and education but could not stop
the steep decline in yields. The way was open for an
attack on the biological theories of the scientists.
[Ref. 27: p. 94]
In this atmosphere of controversy and frustration, Lysenko
advocated theories involving labor-intensive methods "which
(put) a scientific glow over primitive and retrograde
farming" [Ref. 27: p. 94]. His theories gradually gained
support from the Soviet leadership until officially endorsed
by Stalin in 1948. Even as Lysenko's cornbreeding tech-
niques failed to produce high yields, his skills at politi-
cizing biological theories enabled him to retain official
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favor, extend his theories to new applications, and dominate
the field of biology.
... Lysenko skillfully shifted his emphasis from one
nostrum to another— from the cluster-planting of trees,
to the use of specified fertilizer mixes, to the square-
cluster-planting of corn, to his methods of breeding
cows for milk with a high butterfat content. At several
moments in the 1950' s criticism of Lysenko reached
crescendos that seemed to indicate his inevitable
demise, but each time he appears to have been rescued by
highly placed individuals. Lysenko' s resilience, his
ability to take advantage of political situations and to
curry favor, stood him in good stead. By this time, he
was supported by an army of followers in the educational
and agricultural establishments, men whose careers were
intimately connected with Lysenko's school. [Ref. 28:
p. 237]
Lysenko's political skill enabled him to dominate the
biology community until 1965. With the downfall of
Khrushchev in October 1964, however, Lysenko lost his
primary source of support. Criticism increasingly surfaced
until Lysenko was discredited and entered semiretirement in
1965 [Ref. 28: pp. 237-251].
The significance of the Lysenko affair lay in the
measure of control exerted over the scientific community.
Advocates of classical genetics were attacked by Lysenko and
his followers and prevented from conducting research.
Nikolai Vavilov, the leading Soviet classical geneticist,
was removed as president of the Lenin Academy of Agricul-
tural Sciences in 1935, and later died in prison following
his arrest in 1940. Research in classical genetics was
officially prohibited in 1948. In addition to banning
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research, science textbooks and courses were revised and
references to classical genetics eliminated [Ref. 23: pp.
215-8 and pp. 248-9]. Despite extensive influence, however,
Lysenko's domination of biology was incomplete. Mark Adams
traced the ability of one of the leading Soviet centers for
biology research, the Kol'tsov Institute, to pursue research
in classical genetics during Lysenko's predominance.
Through careful political maneuver ings , ideological
adaptations, and maintaining a low public profile, Kol'tsov
succeeded in protecting his institute from 1929 to 1939.
(Despite) the arrest and exile of his key genetics
researchers, Kol'tsov had managed within five years to
reestablish genetics at the core of his institute, and
to continue precisely the same research program that the
earlier group had developed— this despite an almost
total turnover in personnel. By the late 1930s, he was
able to bring back several of the dispersed workers as
well .... [Ref. 23: p. 186]
Even after Kol'tsov succumbed to ideological denunciations
resulting in his dismissal as director in 1938, a small
group of researchers within the institute, including N. P.
Dubinin and B. L. Astaurov, pursued classical genetics
research until 1948.
In that year, of course, "ideological adaptation" was
not enough, since the Lysenko meeting led to specific
directives firing personnel, including Dubinin, and
removing his group from the Kol'tsov Institute.
Nonetheless, even under these harsh conditions, Astaurov
managed to keep his cytogenetics work going in the
institute. [Ref. 23: p. 190]
After Lysenko's fall in 1965, these genetists reemerged as
leading figures in Soviet biology—Astaurov as president of
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the Ail-Union Society of Geneticists and Selectionists and
director of the Institute of Developmental Biology and
Dubinin as head of the Institute of General Genetics [Ref.
23: pp. 190-3; and Ref. 28: p. 251]. While demonstrating
that Lysenko did not fully control genetics research, Adam's
analysis of the Koi'tsov Institute illustrates that
Lysenko 1 s control was extensive and that scientific freedom
in genetics was the exception— acquired only with difficulty
and at great personal risk.
Lysenko' s domination of genetics was not typical of
other fields of Soviet science. However, the Lysenko
episode fully exercised the potential for control of science
content. While ideological interference in other fields has
been minimal, the case of genetics serves to remind Soviet
scientists that the regime's capability for interference,
though latent, is substantial.
C. IDEOLOGY AND RESEARCH PRIORITIES
More significant and pervasive than ideological
interference in theory content, is the impact of ideology in
determining research priorities through resource alloca-
tions. Central planning and the inclusion of research
assignments in the State Budget empower political leaders to
judge the merit of lines of research and to determine their
level of financial and material support. The Soviet prefer-
ence to avoid duplication in research efforts significantly
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increases the impact of this judgement. While the Soviet
political elite has a concentration of backgrounds in
technology, they are not science experts. Thus ideology may
enter as a factor in their determinations. In addition,
Soviet leaders, like Khrushchev, may overestimate their
expertise.
Since the thirties large areas of Soviet technology
and science have been bossed by the half-baked executive
specialist, the man who knows enough of a subject to
play the authority so long as political and technical
authority are confused.... Not Lysenko but Khrushchev
is the prime specimen. He (fancied) himself a
specialist in agricultural policy ... and many people
(took) his pretentions seriously. [Ref. 27: p. 98]
Ideology also influences which general research areas
receive political and material emphasis. Two priorities
command the attention of Soviet leaders and receive the bulk
of resource allocations. The first priority is the
military. Emphasis on military requirements is both
ideologically and culturally reinforced. Soviet ideology
stresses the inevitability of confrontation between
socialist and capitalist states. This confrontation, while
not exclusively military, continually threatens to erupt
into war. Lenin cautioned the Soviet people of their
vulnerability to the implacable hostility of capitalist
nations
.
The experience of the history of revolutions and great
conflicts teaches us that wars, a series of wars, are
inevitable. The existence of a Soviet Republic
alongside of capitalist countries— a Soviet Republic
surrounded by capitalist countr ies--is so intolerable to
the capitalists that they will seize any opportunity to
resume the war. [Ref. 29: p. 631]
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The constant threat' of war necessitates maintaining a strong
military capability and economic base. The ideological
assumption of eventual conflict is consistent with the
traditional military emphasis of Russian culture. This
tradition evolved in reaction to a history of repeated
invasions from both the East and West.
One of the most compelling historical antecedents for
the USSR is that of invasion. In the twelfth century it
was the Mongols, and in the ensuing years came the
Teutonic knights, the Tatars, the Turks, the French and
the Germans. Even the USA is included in this litany,
the Soviets recalling the intervention in northern
Russia and Siberia as an early attempt to smother the
Revolution. This visceral preoccupation with invasion
and encirclement continues.... [Ref. 30: p. 20]
The cultural and ideological prioritization of military
requirements includes the dedication of scientific research
efforts to advancing military technology. This dedication
also has historical precedents.
A preoccupation with defense technology and the
political-military orientation of the state-directed
effort are deeply rooted in Russian history. From the
time of Peter the Great Tsarist governments were
interested in applying technology largely to military
purposes. [Ref. 17: p. 12]
The preoccupation of Soviet science efforts with
military requirements results not only in the dedication of
resources to military related fields but also reinforces the
structural tendencies toward incremental ism . Military
technology utilizes a high level of standardization
compatible with mass production and minimal training
requirements. [Ref. 30: p. 281]
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The overall approach to military research in the Soviet
Union is derived, according to military leaders, from
the Soviet military doctrine designed by Lenin. This
doctrine is based on the theory of scientific communism
and focuses on creating weapons characterized by
simplicity, low cost, easy operation and maintenance,
and few changes. The goals expressed in this doctrine
encourage Soviet military science to be traditional,
incremental, and conservative. The United States, by
contrast, at least since World War II, has sought
revolutionary weapons systems which require an inno-
vative science and technology base. [Ref. 19: p. 20]
Thus ideological and cultural priorities for military
requirements, and doctrinal emphasis on evolutionary and
controlled developments in weapons systems, significantly
affect both the areas of scientific research which receive
resource support and the style of research conducted.
The second priority dominating scientific research
efforts is the technological improvement of industrial
production. Soviet ideology stresses that scientific
research should serve the state, and that industrial
capability is the economic basis for state power. Following
the Revolution, scientists conducting research to advance
"pure science" were criticized as bourgeois, forced to
defend their research in terms of its practical benefit to
the state, and coerced into devoting their efforts to
applied research. In addition, the Party attempted to
reorient Soviet science by filling the Academy ranks with
engineers and allocating resources to institutes emphasizing




(A) "historic" task facing the USSR today, as defined by
General Secretary Brezhnev at the 1971 Party congress
and reaffirmed by the 1976 congress, is "to combine
organically the achievements of the (scientific and
technological revolution) with the advantages of the
socialist economic system, to unfold more broadly our
own, intrinsically socialist forms of fusing science
with production. [Ref. 17: p. 252]
Unlike priorities for military requirements, the industrial
orientation is not reinforced by traditional inclinations.
"The Imperial Academy of Sciences, from the time of its
foundation in 1725, was primarily theoretical in orientation
and relatively isolated from industry" [Ref. 17: p. 10].
Thus the ideological stress on applied science must overcome
traditional biases of the scientific community. Despite
this obstacle, the regime incorporates new incentive systems
and structural revisions to increase the responsiveness of
scientific establishments to production needs and to
encourage production facilities to adopt technological
innovations
.
Ideology, then, affects the distribution of resources to
scientific research by emphasizing military and industrial
requirements. This is consistent with the role of science
as a vehicle for achieving socialism. Science's other
role, as a legitimizing agent--and its corollary threat
as critic— of Party rule generates the potential for
ideological interference in theory content. This capability
was dramatically demonstrated during Lysenko's dominance of
Soviet biology. In general, however, the Soviet regime has
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refrained from such interference and the influence of
ideology has been primarily in determining research




Soviet work in basic science is described by some as
"excellent, comparable to that in America or anywhere else"
[Ref. 3: o. 327] and "internationally recognized to be of
high quality ... (maintaining) high standards throughout
(Academy) laboratories" [Ref. 19: p. 27]. On the other
hand, the output of Soviet science is inconsistent with this
reputation and the level of Soviet investment.
Why doesn't the Soviet Union lead the world in pure
science? It spends as much as the United States, and
it has many distinguished researchers, yet by any
measure—whether Nobel prizes, frequency of citation by
fellow specialists, origin of major breakthroughs, or
simply quantity of publications— U.S. scientists lead
their Soviet colleagues in most disciplines, and in many
there is simply no competition. [Ref. 23: p. 31]
The Soviet lack of Nobel laureates in science is parti-
cularly striking. Of the 376 Nobel prizes awarded in
physics, chemistry, physiology, medicine, and economics
from 1901 through 1982, only eleven were received by Soviet
or Russian scientists (see Table VIII). This contrasts with
151 awards received by United States scientists and sixty-
three awards received by British scientists [Ref. 8: p. 327;
Ref. 19: p. 4; and Ref. 31: pp. 407-9]. Thus, despite
major expenditures on scientific research and maintenance of




Russian and Soviet Nobel Laureates in Science
1904— Ivan Petrovich Pavlov: Studies of the physiology of
medicine
1903--Elie Metchnikoff: Work on immunity
1956— Nikolai Nikolayevich Semenov : Research on chemical
reaction kinetics
1958— Pavel A. Cherenkov, Igor E. Tamm , Ilya M. Frank: Work
resulting in development of cosmic ray counter
1962— Lev Davidovich Landau: Investigations of the low-
temperature behavior of matter
1964--Nikolai Gennad iyev ich Basov, Alexsandr Mikhaylovich
Prokhorov: Work in quantum electronics related to
lasers
1975--Leonid Vi talayev ich Kantorovich: Economic analysis of
optimal resource utilization
1978--Petr Leonidovich Kapitsa: Work on low-temperature
physics




fails to produce comparable levels of scientific break-
throughs. This apparent inconsistency is due largely to
Soviet proficiency in normal scientific research and their
cultural inability to accommodate to extraordinary scien-
tific progress.
Russian culture and Soviet ideology generate an
environment conducive to normal scientific achievements but
inimical to extraordinary scientific advancement. Several
attributes of Russian culture, manifested in and reinforced
by Soviet organizational structures, are fundamental
characteristics of normal science. Strong cohesiveness
within the scientific community— both in shared images and
common standards of scientific practice--is encouraged by
the cultural emphasis on consensus and group orientation.
The Soviet education system then transmits the community
image and standards to new generations of scientists through
rigorous traditional methods of science education. These
educational methods, utilizing paradigm-based solution
techniques, capitalize on the existing Russian prediliction
for pattern recognition, which is characteristic of high
context cultures. In addition, the low cultural tolerance
for uncertainty and resulting preference for conservative,
incremental change are compatible with the puzzle solving
tradition of normal science. This tradition is dependent on
a strong consensus regarding existing theory, which enables
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the scientific community to clearly define research problem
areas. The definition of research problems is well suited
for incorporation into the Soviet planning process. The
research institute is able to submit proposals with
confidence in meeting stated objectives, and policy makers
are assured of continuity and controlled change. Thus,
Russian culture is highly congruent with practicing normal
science .
The Soviet proficiency in normal science and puzzle
solving contributed to their dramatic initial success in the
space program. Robert Kaiser traces the evolution of the
Soviet space program, pointing out the significant reliance
on a static technological base.
In basic rocketry (the Soviets) have made little
progress. The rocket which carried the Soviet
cosmonauts into space to meet the Americans in July
1975 had not been significantly modified for 12 years.
It is based on the design of the V-2 rocket built by the
Nazis in World War II. The Russians have never mastered
high-energy rocket fuels, and still use kerosene.
[Ref. 8: p. 321]
Soviet successes in space have resulted from creative and
thorough exploitation of existing theories. Sergei
Pavlovich Korolyov resolved the Soviet's inability to
develop metals able to withstand the heat generated by large
rocket engines by clustering smaller engines at the base of
the rocket. Thus, four small engines provided the necessary
thrust to launch the first Sputnik rocket. The same
clustering techniques, this time using five clusters of four
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engines, provided the additional thrust needed to launch the
first man into orbit. Later, larger crews of two or three
men were sent into space by selecting men of small frame,
thus reducing the weight requirements [Ref. 8: pp. 320-325].
These accomplishments demonstrated the Soviet's ability to
solve problems creatively adapting proven technology rather
than developing new technologies and theories.
This same puzzle solving creativity is evident in the
engineering and design of Soviet weapon systems. Captain
J. W. Kehoe, in comparing United States and Soviet design
practices, noted the ability of Soviet military designers to
achieve simplicity and a high level of component
standardization through innovative adjustments to proven
technology.
The simplicity of Soviet weapon systems is the result of
clever conceptual designs to meet producibili ty
,
reliability and maintainability requirements.... The
standardization in Soviet weapon systems appears to
reduce system development risk and improve producibil ity
and reliability. However, it also restricts technical
innovation and system performance. These deficiencies
are offset, in part, by highly skilled designers who
are often able to conceive clever design solutions using
obsolescent components. [Ref. 32: p. 709]
Thus, military technology as well as space technology
demonstrates the Soviet proclivity for innovation and
creative exploitation of known concepts. This innovative
and thorough exploitation, which is the mark of superior




In several fields Soviet scientists do leading work by
maintaining a steady effort in traditional specialties
or established methodologies. For example, Soviet
scientists hold a dominant position in electrochemistry,
which has been neglected as too "settled" in the United
States. American science searches restlessly for the
new method or the original topic that appears to promise
a breakthrough; but Soviet science often excels by
following through with extensive surveying and
cataloguing, such as ex tragalactic mapping or protein
sequencing. Soviet scientists are also respected for
traditional, large-scale expeditionary work in biology,
geology, and oceanography, for which they have much more
elaborate logistical support than American university
scientists are usually able to get. [Ref. 23: p. 33]
Soviet scientists, then, are persistent and creative within
the context of accepted theories. This is the creativity of
high context cultures and the puzzle solving proficiency of
normal scientists.
The Russian characteristics which enable this success in
normal science, however, inhibit the divergent elements
necessary for extraordinary science. Periods of extra-
ordinary scientific progress are typified by new ideas,
conflict, and radical change. Given the Russian fear of
uncertainty, these elements are intolerable in the Soviet
Union. They are, therefore, suppressed through structural
mechanisms and social indoctrination which ensure conformity
and incremental ism . In addition, the Soviet system
discourages those conditions most likely to result in the
perception of anomaly or the construction of new patterns of
thought— the exposure of young scientists to basic research
and the fresh insight provided by scientists changing
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specializations. Basic research in the Soviet Union is
dominated by older scientists, whose control is reinforced
by frhe funding process and other structural mechanisms.
This restricts access to basic research for younger
scientists. In addition, Soviet science is characterized by
a lack of mobility both between research institutes and
between specializations. Thus the domination of older
scientists and the relative immobility of personnel enable
accepted theories to remain entrenched and unchallenged.
The awareness of anomalies and alternative theories
necessary to produce extraordinary scientific advancement is
minimized in Soviet science. Even after anomalies are
acknowledged and alternate theories constructed, the Soviet
scientific community is slow to adopt new ideas.
... Soviet science is often slow to accept radical
conceptual changes or take up new approaches, especially
if they result from observational data from other
fields. Soviet geologists, for example, have restricted
plate- tectonic theory, and the new doctrine is being
spread from outside their field by oceanographers
.
Radio astronomy has only recently achieved a status
equal to optical astronomy in Soviet science policy.
In psychology, the dominance of Pavlovian ideas long
delayed the development of other branches of psychology,
and to this day Soviet psychologists put more emphasis
on neurophysiology than on neurochemistry , which
stresses the molecular basis of neural activity. [Ref.
23: p. 33]
Thus, new ideas are both slow to emerge and slow to gain
acceptance in Soviet science.
The effect of Russian culture, then, is to skew Soviet
science toward normal and away from extraordinary research.
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Thus, the Soviet system cannot maintain the tension between
convergent and divergent tendencies essential to rapid
scientific progress. In this, Soviet science is very
similar to the Japanese scientific style described in
Chapter III. Consensus, pattern recognition capability, and
traditional education techniques are elements common to both
cultures. And, like the Japanese, the Soviet Union must
turn to foreign technology sources to prevent stagnation in
the normal science phase. This dependence was cynically
acknowledged by A. G. Aganbegyan, an academician and
director of the Institute of Economics and Industrial
Organization at Novosibirsk.
(Once) asked whether the USSR could overtake the
United States in science and economic development ...
(Aganbegyan) ... replied that if that should ever
happen, the Soviet Union would have to stop and let the
United States get ahead again, since if (the Soviets)
did not have the Americans in front of (them they) would
not know which way to go. In Aganbegyan 1 s opinion, the
achievements of Soviet science are usually a function of
those of the United States: as presently constituted,
Russia's scientific community does not and cannot
produce any fundamentally new and original results.
[Ref. 23: p. 66]
Periodic reinv igoration by external sources has
historically been elemental to the evolution of Russian and
Soviet science. Peter the Great initiated this pattern by
importing Western scientists and basing the Academy of
Sciences on Western models. Catherine the Great also
imported foreign expertise to modernize Russian science, as
did later Tsars. The Soviet regime continued this tradition
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and especially utilized German expertise in military
technology in the 1920s and 1930s. This acquisition was
largely in the form of industrial equipment and weapons;
however, as basic scientific research became increasingly
relevant to military capabilities after World War II, Soviet
efforts expanded to include ail aspects of foreign science
and technology.
The Soviet Union has drawn considerably on foreign
science and technology, not only in the form of imported
weapons (mainly in the 1930s and 1940s) , but also in the
form of design concepts, and more generally in basic and
applied scientific research. [Ref. 18: p. 214]
Thus, reliance on foreign technology has occurred throughout
Russian and Soviet history since Peter the Great. Once
science and technology gained recognition as essential
elements in national security, the Soviets increased efforts
to acquire foreign advancements to reinvigorate their own
technological base. The Soviet awareness of their
dependence on foreign technology became especially evident
in the 1970s when "... the thrust of official policy ... was
increasingly to make foreign technology acquisition an
explicit variable in R&D policy planning and world standards
a specific criterion for evaluating and improving Soviet R&D
performance" [Ref. 17: p. 151].
Russian culture forces Soviet science to turn to
external sources for breakthroughs generated by extra-
ordinary research. Like the Japanese, the Soviets are
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proficient at exploiting foreign generated theories. This
has been particularly evident in the incorporation of
Western technology into military systems.
Western technological developments are closely studied,
and are copied in those areas where they are considered
of value.... This is not to be taken as proof that all
advanced Soviet technology is copied from the West, but
rather as evidence of Soviet preparedness to investigate
and exploit technology, even if it is "not invented
here." Indeed, this inquisitive attitude to technology
has become one of the features of Soviet Military
Doctrine. Its net result is to ensure that, although
the USSR remains technologically behind the West, due to
the fact that the Soviets are prepared to invest first
in the military application of new technology, that
technology is incorporated into battlefield systems far
earlier than is often the case in the West during
peacetime
.
Just as the Japanese were able to rapidly excel in solid-
state electronics, acquisition of foreign technology coupled
with proficiency in normal science enables the Soviets to
remain abreast in military technology despite their inabil-
ity to generate extraordinary scientific breakthroughs.
Soviet science, however, differs from the Japanese in
two significant respects. First, the Soviets lack
flexibility— the characteristic which enables the Japanese
to readily assimilate and modify foreign ideas. Although
the Soviets actively and energetically seek foreign
technology, they do so with deeply ingrained feelings of
cultural xenophobia. The Soviets are keenly aware of their
vulnerability should access to foreign technology be
restricted. The President of the Academy of Sciences, A. P.
149

Aleksandrov, questioned the Soviet dependence on foreign
technology by pointing out that "'it is not correct to
create, through our own efforts, areas of technological
backwardness by using foreign technology on an un j ustif iedly
broad scale' 1 ' [Ref. 20: p. 220]. This fear of vulnerability
is complemented by two other Russian characteristics. One
is national pride in self reliance and Russian capabilities.
The other characteristic is the Russian fear that foreign
ideas will disrupt consensus and foment discontent. This
latter characteristic contributes to the second major
difference between Soviet and Japanese science— the rapid
dissemination of new ideas and reconstruction of consensus.
Because of the Russian fear of losing control of the people,
exposure to potentially disruptive foreign ideas is
restricted to those areas where it is essential to meet the
needs of national security— in other words, military
research institutes. All scientists are restricted in their
contact with foreign scientists, and civilian scientists
also have restricted access to foreign scientific
literature. Lateral communication is further confined by
classification of militarily applicable scientific and
technological advancements and the rigid hierarchical
structure of Soviet science. In the Soviet context, this
compromises the need to maintain control and the need to
acquire foreign generated breakthroughs to meet national
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security requirements. As a result of these differences--
the lack of flexibility and restricted communications-- the
Soviet Union, even in military technology, does not achieve
the spectacular results of the Japanese in exploiting
foreign ideas. In addition, successful Soviet exploitation
is largely confined to the military, and scientific
development in other areas is highly uneven.
(The) Soviet Union has demonstrated the ability to
innovate, but usually in a few selected priority areas.
It has not demonstrated a capacity for technological
innovation along a broad front. [Ref. 17: p. 328]
Russian culture, then, significantly affects the
development of Soviet science and compels the Soviet Union
to acquire Western technology to meet national security
needs. Cultural characteristics change only slowly even
under historical pressures and Russian culture has proven
especially tenacious. The effect of cultural tenacity on
Soviet efforts to overcome deficiencies in divergent
elements is evident in the evolution of the Academy's
Siberian Department at Novosibirsk. Established in the late
1950s, the Siberian Department and the associated University
of Novosibirsk were an attempt to create an intellectually
dynamic center of scientific expertise. In its first
decade, the project was highly successful. Young scientists
were encouraged and supported, research and education were
highly integrated, and organizational structures were
informal to encourage interaction and communication between
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personnel [Ref. 19: pp. 40-1 J. With time, however,
entrenched Russian characteristics reappeared,
Khrushchev established the Siberian Department of the
Academy in 1957 partly to overcome the seniority
system. Many of the new institutions established at
Academgorodok succeeded in bringing together young men,
unfettered by their elders, who did brilliant work.
Twenty years later, however, those young men are no
longer so young. [Ref. 8: p. 332]
Within two decades, the informality of Academgorodok was
replaced by positional stratification; gerontocracy again
dominated research; and the stimulating intellectual
atmosphere had dimmed [Ref. 24: pp. 153-179]. The inertia
of Russian culture proved unyielding to Soviet attempts to
invigorate science internally. It is therefore unlikely
that the Soviet Union will develop an indigenous capability
to generate and sustain the divergent elements of tension
essential to rapid scientific progress. Their dependence on
foreign technology will continue despite xenophobic qualms
regarding their vulnerabilities. The. implications for the
United States are, first, that if restricted from access to
foreign technology, the Soviet Union cannot compete on the
scientific and technological levels, and second, that with
continued access to foreign technology, the Soviet
proficiency in normal science will enable them to remain
abreast of, and potentially improve on, Western techno-
logical levels in deployed systems. Control of technology
transfer to the Soviet Union is therefore a vital
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